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Abstract 
 
This paper examines whether the voluntary disclosure of audit committee activities in 
proxy statements increases market participants’ perception about the firm’s reporting 
credibility. In recent years, various stakeholders have expressed concern about the lack of 
transparency in how audit committees execute their responsibilities. To enhance investor 
confidence in financial reporting, companies have started to voluntarily provide additional 
task-oriented information about the audit committee oversight process beyond the limited 
regulatory requirement. Using textual content analysis techniques, I test whether these 
narrative disclosures improve market participants’ perception of the quality of reported 
earnings, captured by the earnings response coefficient (ERC) and analysts’ forecast 
dispersion (DISP). I find that, relative to a matched control sample of non-disclosing firms, 
the ERC of disclosing firms is significantly higher and their analysts’ forecast dispersion 
is significantly lower after the voluntary disclosure of audit committee activities and these 
effects increase with the number of dimensions of audit committee tasks disclosed. Further, 
cross-sectional analysis shows that the effects on ERC and DISP after the disclosure are 
incrementally greater for firms with a weak information environment. In light of the SEC’s 
renewed interest in improving transparency of the audit committee process, I provide 
timely evidence of the usefulness of narrative audit committee disclosures in enhancing the 
credibility of financial reporting. 
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1. Introduction 
 Strong internal monitoring enhances investor confidence in the information 
disclosed by a firm. The principal objective of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) (SOX) was 
to restore investor confidence in the capital market following numerous accounting 
scandals and audit failures. In addition to provisions aimed at enhancing board and auditor 
independence, the Act strengthened the audit committee’s oversight of the financial 
reporting process and external audit. That audit committees play a significant role in 
improving financial reporting quality and internal control effectiveness is shown by prior 
empirical studies (e.g. Krishnan, 2005; Abbott et al., 2004; Klein, 2002; Beasley et al., 
2009). However, as perceived by some institutional investors and corporate governance 
activists, there is a lack of transparency about how audit committees execute their 
responsibilities.1 To mitigate the potential effect of this lack of transparency on financial 
reporting credibility, companies have started to voluntarily provide additional information 
about the audit committee’s work beyond the limited requirements of Item 407 of 
Regulation S-K (Blue Ribbon Committee 1999). 2  This paper examines whether the 
voluntary disclosure of audit committee activities improves investors’ perception of the 
credibility of a firm’s financial reporting. 
                                                          
1 See, for example, reports issued by the Center for Audit Quality (CAQ) 2013: Enhancing the Audit 
Committee Report (2013), available at https://www.thecaq.org/enhancing-audit-committee-report-call-
action/. Council of Institutional Investors (CII), Policies on Corporate Governance, Section 2.13 (updated 
Sept. 27, 2013), available at http://www.cii.org/corp_gov_policies#BOD . Ernst & Young (EY) ( Feb. 
2013), Audit Committee Reporting to Shareholders: Going Beyond the Minimum, available 
at:https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Audit_committee_reporting_to_shareholders:_going_beyo
nd_the_minimum/$FILE/Audit_committee_reporting_CF0039.pdf; National Association of Corporate 
Directors (NACD) Summary of Proceedings, Audit Committee Chair Advisory Council (June 19, 2013), 
available at http://www.nacdonline.org/Resources/Article.cfm?ItemNumber=7284.  
2 Center for Audit Quality (CAQ), Audit Committee Transparency Barometer (2014, 2015, 2016), available 
at https://www.thecaq.org/resources. 
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 At the time of enactment of SOX, the SEC expressed its belief that “disclosures 
about a company’s audit committee and its interaction with the company’s auditors and 
management will promote investors’ confidence in the integrity of the financial reporting 
process.”3 The rationale behind this argument is that, when investors learn more about the 
oversight process, it helps them gain useful context for the audit committee’s decisions. 
This enables them to better understand the quality of board monitoring in general and audit 
committee oversight in particular. In addition, the audit committee is likely to follow the 
specified process more strictly, because its public disclosure will make any deviation costly. 
Thus, investors will have more confidence in the audit committee’s monitoring role and as 
a result will place greater credence in the financial information disclosed by the firm. 
 The concern expressed by the SEC and investor groups stems from the belief that 
simply knowing that a firm has an audit committee is not enough to convince investors that 
there is strong internal monitoring. This could be because investors perceive that all audit 
committees are not equally effective. This is in fact borne out by prior empirical research 
that provides evidence of variation in monitoring effectiveness of audit committees (e.g., 
Beasley et al. 2009; Cohen et al. 2010; Lisic et al. 2016). Thus, to differentiate themselves, 
effective audit committees may voluntarily disclose specific task-oriented information 
about their operations to signal their quality to investors. However, given the non-
observability of the audit committee’s effort, investors may still not be able to distinguish 
between effective and ineffective audit committees. In this case, audit committee 
disclosures will not improve investors’ perception of the quality of the firm’s financial 
information. To the extent specified audit committee tasks are ex post verifiable (e.g., 
                                                          
3 SEC Release No. 34-42266: Audit committee disclosure (Jan 2010), available at:  
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-42266.htm 
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selection criteria used for hiring external auditors), it will be costly for ineffective audit 
committees to disclose, so that disclosures of effective audit committees will be credible.4 
Ultimately, whether audit committee disclosures enhance investors’ confidence in the 
firm’s financial reporting is an empirical question that I address. 
 Companies voluntarily disclose specific tasks undertaken by the audit committee 
that bear upon the effectiveness of the committee’s oversight of financial reporting and 
external audit. I categorize the disclosure into three dimensions based on reported trends 
(CAQ reports 2014–2016), SEC’s conceptual release (2015)5, and the literature about the 
audit committee oversight process (Beasley et al. 2009). The three dimensions include: 
annual review and evaluation of auditors, factors considered for the selection of auditors 
including the tenure of the engagement partner, and audit committee’s involvement in the 
selection of the engagement partner. I then obtain information about the three dimensions 
by electronically processing audit committees’ textual disclosures in proxy statements 
included in the SEC’s Edgar DEF 14 filings. 
 For a sample of U.S. public companies over the period 2003-2015, I assess the 
impact of disclosure of audit committee activities on financial reporting credibility. I use 
two measures to capture market participants’ perception of financial reporting credibility 
– the earnings response coefficient (ERC) as a measure of investors’ perception and 
analysts’ forecast dispersion (DISP) as a measure of analysts’ perception of the firm’s 
financial reporting quality. I employ a difference-in-differences research design to evaluate 
the change in ERC and DISP in the post period. I use three years preceding the first year 
                                                          
4 The ex post verifiability of disclosures may lead to scrutiny by various interest groups, e.g., investors, the 
SEC, and litigators, thus imposing costs on ineffective audit committees for false disclosures.   
5 SEC Release No. 33-9862; 34-75344, Possible Revisions to Audit Committee Disclosures (July 2015), 
available at: https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2015/33-9862.pdf. 
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of disclosure as the pre-disclosure period and years following the initial disclosure year as 
the post-disclosure period. The post-period does not include years in which the firm 
discontinues disclosure. Since initiating voluntary disclosure of audit committee activities 
is a firm’s choice, I model the determinants of the disclosure decision, based on firm size, 
market-to-book ratio, leverage, earnings persistence, market beta and accounting quality in 
the initial disclosure year. I use an entropy balancing technique to obtain a balanced control 
sample of non-disclosing firms. I find that the distributional properties of the treatment and 
control samples are virtually identical. 
 I estimate a regression of 3-day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around annual 
earnings announcements on earnings surprise (relative to the prevailing analyst consensus) 
using the treatment sample of disclosers and the control sample of non-disclosers. I find 
that, relative to the control sample, the ERC of the sample of disclosers is significantly 
higher after the voluntary disclosure of audit committee activities. Similarly, I find that 
analysts’ forecast dispersion of the sample of disclosers is significantly lower after the 
voluntary disclosure of audit committee activities. In addition to the disclose/not disclose 
decision, I also construct a variable that scores the number of dimensions of audit 
committee activities disclosed by a firm on a scale of 1 to 3. My results show that the 
incremental effects of audit committee disclosure on ERC and DISP are increasing in the 
number of dimensions disclosed. Further, I find that among all disclosure dimensions, the 
one that specifies the process of review and evaluation of the auditor’s work has the greatest 
incremental effect on ERC and DISP. Overall, these results suggest that task-oriented audit 
committee disclosures enhance investors’ and analysts’ confidence in the firm’s reported 
earnings. 
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 I conduct cross-sectional analyses to explore settings that are likely to be associated 
with greater improvement in investor or analyst perceptions of financial reporting quality 
in response to audit committee disclosures. Since investors are likely to have lower 
confidence in the financial reports of firms with a weak information environment, I expect 
a greater increase in the credibility of financial information for these firms after the 
disclosure of audit committee activities. Consistent with this expectation, I find that the 
increase in ERC is incrementally greater for firms covered by fewer financial analysts and 
firms with higher return volatility in the disclosure year. Similarly, I find a greater decrease 
in DISP for firms with higher return volatility in the disclosure year. 
 My interpretation of the ERC finding assumes that the disclosure change is only 
intended to provide information about audit committee oversight to enhance investors’ 
perception about earnings quality and does not result from an actual improvement in the 
quality of the audit committee. If this assumption does not hold, the increase in ERC after 
the disclosure could potentially be driven by an increase in earnings quality due to an 
improvement in audit committee monitoring. I examine whether the higher ERC in the 
post-disclosure period is due to an increase in investors’ perception of earnings quality or 
an increase in earnings quality itself. First, I test whether the earnings quality of the 
disclosing firms relative to non-disclosing control firms increases after the voluntary 
disclosure. Using measures of earnings quality developed by Kothari et al. (2005) and 
McNichols (2002), I find no significant change in earnings quality for the disclosing firms 
relative to the control firms in the post-disclosure period. Second, I estimate regressions 
for two subsamples, above-median and below-median change in earnings quality, and 
obtain the incremental change in ERC for the two groups in the post-disclosure period. I 
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find no significant difference in the change in ERC of the two earnings quality subsamples, 
suggesting that the incremental increase in ERC in the post-disclosure period is not due to 
a change in earnings quality but rather due to a change in investors’ perception about 
earnings quality. I also conduct a similar analysis on DISP and find no significant 
difference in the decrease in DISP of the two earnings quality subsamples. Collectively, 
my evidence suggests that audit committee disclosures provide information about the 
company’s internal monitoring efficiency and thus enhance investors’ confidence in the 
company’s financial reporting. 
  I also examine if there is a decrease in ERC when a disclosing firm later 
discontinues the voluntary disclosure of audit committee information. I find that ERC 
decreases significantly after the firm stops disclosing information about the audit 
committee’s oversight role and this decrease is not due to a change in accounting quality. 
Similarly, I find an increase in DISP after a firm discontinues audit committee disclosures 
(although the significance is weak).   
 This study contributes to the literature on voluntary accounting disclosures. Many 
prior disclosure studies provide evidence on the economic consequences of voluntary 
disclosures about the firm’s performance (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Beyer et al. 2010). My 
paper adds to the recent literature that focuses on disclosures about the internal working of 
the company. Studies in this research area examine the effect of disclosure of personal 
information of boards and executives (e.g., Gow, Wahid and Yu 2016). I examine 
disclosures that inform investors about the responsibilities and activities of the company’s 
audit committee and find that these content disclosures help to improve investors’ and 
analysts’ confidence in financial reporting. 
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 This study also contributes to the line of research on the effectiveness of audit 
committees. Early studies have shown that the existence of an audit committee and its 
composition affect the quality of financial reporting (Carcello and Neal 2000; McDaniel et 
al. 2002; Cohen et al. 2004). In particular, several studies have focused on the effects of 
audit committee financial expertise mandated by SOX. Evidence suggests that audit 
committee financial expertise mitigates internal control weaknesses (Krishnan 2005), 
reduces the likelihood of restatements (Abbott et al. 2004), increases the accuracy of 
management forecasts (Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008), improves accruals quality 
(Dhaliwal et al. 2010), and improves the broader information environment (Farber et al. 
2018). In contrast with this line of inquiry, I focus on the textual content of disclosures 
about audit committee activities that are not as yet mandated by the SEC. There is limited 
research on how such additional information impacts investors’ decisions. It is important 
to shed light on this issue in face of the expressed demand for such disclosures from various 
stakeholders. In response, the SEC has issued a conceptual release on “Possible Revisions 
to Audit Committee Disclosures” with respect to the audit committee’s oversight of the 
independent auditor and has sought comments from the public about the need for greater 
transparency about the audit committee’s oversight process (July 2015). This paper 
provides timely evidence suggesting that narrative disclosures about audit committee 
activities are useful in building investor confidence in financial reporting.  
 Section 2 provides background information about the current disclosure 
requirements relating to audit committees. Section 3 explains the hypothesis development. 
Section 4 discusses the research design, sample selection and results and section 5 
concludes.  
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2. Audit Committee disclosures 
 
2.1 Current regulations about audit committee disclosures 
 The existing regulations about audit committee disclosures evolved over two stages 
– the SEC’s adoption of the Blue Ribbon Committee’s recommendations in 1999, and the 
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. In 1999, the SEC issued new rules to 
improve disclosures relating to the functioning, governance and independence of audit 
committees and to enhance the credibility of financial statements of public companies. Item 
407 of Regulation S-K requires companies’ proxy statements to include certain statements 
about the audit committee’s responsibilities for overseeing financial reporting, internal 
control and external audit. These statements must specify that the audit committee has: 1) 
reviewed and discussed the audited financial statements with management; 2) discussed 
with the auditor the matters required to be communicated to the audit committee; 3) 
received the required written communication from the external auditor concerning 
independence and discussed his or her independence; 4) recommended to the board of 
directors that audited financial statements be included in the company’s annual report. 
 In addition to the contents of the audit committee report, Item 407 requires 
disclosures about the characteristics and regular activities of the audit committee, including: 
1) the name of each member of the audit committee and whether the committee has at least 
one member with financial expertise; 2) whether audit committee members are independent 
and cases of audit committee appointments of directors who are not independent; 3) the 
number of meetings held and information about member attendance at meetings; 4) 
whether or not the audit committee has a charter; and 5) whether there is a separately-
9 
 
designated standing audit committee or a committee performing similar functions, and the 
identity of each member. 
 In 2002, the enactment of SOX enhanced the ability of audit committees to achieve 
auditor independence. In addition to the pre-approval of services provided by independent 
auditors and audit fees, SOX requires an issuer to disclose the following: 1) audit 
committee’s pre-approval policies and procedures; 2) all fees paid to independent auditors 
in the two most recent fiscal years. Further, if an issuer solicits approval from shareholders 
about the appointment of auditors, shareholders must receive information about the 
following: 1) name of the auditor selected; 2) the most recent auditor if different from the 
new one; 3) auditor’s attendance at the meeting and details about dismissed auditors. 
 To summarize, the existing regulation emphasizes the role of the audit committee 
with respect to its oversight of the auditor, but it does not require any disclosures about 
how the audit committee executes its responsibilities. In other words, the existing rules do 
not require disclosures describing the audit committee’s process and reasons for selecting 
an independent auditor. These are the focus of the voluntary disclosures that I am 
examining in this paper. 
2.2 SEC’s conceptual release and related debates 
 There appears to be a market demand for audit committee information based on the 
fact that a significant number of companies voluntarily provide information beyond the 
current rules. In response, the SEC sent out a Conceptual Release in 2015 to seek input on 
whether and how additional reporting may be useful to investors. The commission 
categorized its interest in receiving comments into three groups: the audit committee’s 
oversight of the auditor, the audit committee’s process for selecting the auditor, and the 
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audit committee’s consideration of the qualifications of the audit firm and certain members 
of the engagement team when selecting the audit firm (SEC Conceptual release No. 33-
9862).  
 However, the response from interested parties is mixed. Some respondents believe 
in encouraging a voluntary, market-driven approach rather than mandating additional 
prescriptive disclosures (e.g., CAQ comment letter 2015)6, whereas some are supportive 
of mandating firms to make audit committee disclosures in the aforementioned categories 
(as discussed in the conceptual release) and believe that rules should be principles-based 
(e.g., PwC’s comment letter issued in 2015). Overall, while the SEC is considering 
requiring new disclosures, so far there have been no changes to audit committee disclosure 
requirements since the enactment of SOX in 2002. 
 
3. Hypothesis development  
 
 There are two strands of literature that relate to my main hypothesis. First, the body 
of research on audit committees examines the role of audit committees in overseeing 
financial reporting. Early studies have documented evidence on the association between 
audit committee presence, audit committee effectiveness and incidence of financial 
misstatements (Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al. 1996, McMullen et al. 1996, Abbott et al. 
2000). Research after the enactment of SOX shows that independence and expertise of 
audit committees are associated with fewer restatements, smaller discretionary abnormal 
accruals, fewer cases of internal control material weakness and timely resolution of such 
                                                          
6 Center for Audit Quality, SEC: Concept Release on Possible Revisions to Audit Committee Disclosures 
(Sep. 2015), available at: https://www.thecaq.org/sec-concept-release-possible-revisions-audit-committee-
disclosures/. 
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weakness (Abbott et al., 2004, Klein, 2002, Xie et al., 2003, Krishnan, 2005, Goh, 2009). 
Further, audit committee financial expertise is shown to be associated with more 
conservatism, higher accruals quality, and positive price reactions (e.g. Defond et al., 2005; 
Krishnan, 2005; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008; Dhaliwal et al. 2010). The collective 
evidence suggests that effective audit committee oversight is essential for investor 
protection and the functioning of capital markets. 
 A second line of research relates to the transparency of audit committees. As 
discussed earlier, mandatory disclosure about audit committees is limited. As the SEC 
Chairman Jay Clayton states “…it is important to evaluate whether investors have the 
information they need to make informed decisions.”7 Based on the dramatic increase in 
supplemental disclosures, there seems to be an “expectation gap” about audit committee 
transparency between the company and its investors. Roundtable meetings (CAQ 2013) 
and comments to Conceptual release (SEC 2015) show a consistent demand from market 
participants for revised regulations to improve transparency. Opponents among board 
members, corporate management and auditors consider such a revision unnecessary and 
believe that voluntary rather than mandatory disclosures are more meaningful. Proponents 
including a majority of investors support mandatory disclosure. They believe that the 
current disclosure regime already allows voluntary disclosure and more required disclosure 
would improve comparability among companies (EY 2016)8. While there is no consensus 
on this issue, investors are seeking greater disclosure on audit committees. Many 
                                                          
7 “A Conversation with SEC Chairman Jay Clayton”, Interview, September 28, 2017 at the Brookings 
Institution. The remarks can be found at: https://www.brookings.edu/events/perspectives-on-securities-
regulation/.  
8 . Ernst & Young (EY) (September 2016). EY Center for Board Matters, Audit Committee Reporting to 
Shareholders in 2016, available at https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-audit-committee-
reporting-to-shareholders-in-2016/$FILE/ey-audit-committee-reporting-to-shareholders-in-2016.pdf. 
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companies seem to acknowledge such a need and respond positively by providing more 
information related to audit committee work.  
 However, empirical evidence on the effect of audit committee disclosures is limited. 
DeFond, Hann and Hu (2005) provide evidence that investors respond favorably to the 
information about audit committee’s expertise. Carcello et al. (2000) examine the 
disclosures in audit committee charters and reports and find that voluntary disclosure of 
audit committee activities is more common for depository institutions, larger companies, 
NYSE-listed companies and companies with more independent audit committees. Rezaee 
et al. (2003) examine audit reports and audit committee charters of Fortune 100 companies 
and find that all companies follow the SEC requirements.  
 A recent working paper by Reid et al. (2018) examines the effect of the regulatory 
changes on auditor and audit committee reporting in the UK. The Financial Reporting 
Council’s (FRC) new policies instruct audit committees to discuss significant issues 
considered by the committee, how they address these issues and how they evaluate the 
external auditor. The paper shows that the new reporting regime is associated with 
decreased earnings management and thus improved audit quality, proxied by significant 
decreases in absolute abnormal accruals and the propensity to just meet or beat analyst 
forecasts.  
 Given the role of audit committees in enhancing information quality and the 
expressed demand from various stakeholders for more audit committee information, the 
SEC release 34-42266 states, “…disclosures about companies’ audit committee and its 
interaction with the company’s auditors and management will promote investors’ 
confidence in the integrity of the financial reporting process.” Given that one of the 
13 
 
purposes for audit committee disclosures is to enhance investors’ confidence in financial 
reporting, it is reasonable to predict that the supplemental disclosure about audit 
committee’s activities will help investors better understand the audit committee’s oversight 
role and thus increase their confidence in the companies’ financial information.  
 On the other hand, there may be a concern that the supplemental audit committee 
disclosures may be simply boiler-plate or may not reflect the audit committee process 
accurately. However, the ex post verifiability of certain audit committee tasks makes it less 
likely that boards will approve disclosures of inaccurate information. Such disclosures will 
impose significant costs on companies as well as boards, particularly given the recent 
evidence of increased litigation against board members about their monitoring 
effectiveness and increased scrutiny of such information by the SEC communicated via 
comment letters. Overall, litigation threat and regulatory scrutiny will encourage effective 
audit committees to disclose credible supplemental disclosures of their activities. Since 
these disclosures are voluntary, ineffective audit committees will be less likely to disclose. 
Thus, I expect that stock market participants’ perception of the quality of accounting 
information will be enhanced by the voluntary disclosure of the audit committee’s work. 
This leads to the main hypothesis (stated in the alternative form): 
 Hypothesis 1: The voluntary disclosure of audit committee’s oversight role 
enhances investors’ confidence in the firm’s financial reporting. 
             
            Lang and Lundholm (1996) reason that, if more analysts use private information in 
the forecasting process, belief dispersion among analysts will increase. Based on this 
argument, DeHaan et al. (2013) examine the setting of executive compensation clawback 
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provisions to test whether the adoption of clawbacks improves analysts’ perception of the 
firm’s financial reporting credibility as reflected in their forecast dispersion. Following the 
reasoning in DeHaan et al. (2013), if information about audit committee activities improves 
market participants’ beliefs about the firm’s financial reporting credibility, then I expect 
that analysts will make better use of this common information source in making their 
forecasts. As a result, I expect that analysts’ forecast dispersion (DISP) will decrease 
following the initiation of voluntary disclosure about audit committee activities. 
           Hypothesis 2: The voluntary disclosure of audit committee’s oversight role 
enhances analysts’ confidence in the firm’s financial reporting. 
 
4. Research design 
4.1  Variable measurement 
4.1.1 Credibility of financial reporting 
  To measure investors’ perception of the quality of accounting information, I test 
the effect of disclosure on the ERC. I reason that investors’ response to an earnings surprise 
will depend on the perceived credibility of the earnings report. I assess investor credibility 
by measuring the 3-day announcement-period market response to annual earnings surprises. 
Investors are likely to respond more strongly to a given level of earnings surprise, if they 
have more confidence in the accuracy of the reported earnings.  
  In the theoretical literature, Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988) show that, under 
fairly general conditions, the price reaction to an earnings release is increasing in the signal-
to-noise ratio of the earnings surprise. According to Kim and Verrecchia (1991), an 
increase in credibility is similar to an increase in the signal-to-noise ratio because it 
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captures investors’ assessment of the accuracy of the earnings news. Relying on these 
arguments, there is widespread usage of ERCs as a proxy for investors’ assessment of 
reporting credibility (e.g., Kothari 2001, Dechow et al. 2010, Wilson, 2008; Chen et al. 
2014; Gipper et al. 2015; Reid et al. 2015; Stein et al. 2016; Ferri et al. 2017). I follow the 
prior empirical literature and interpret an increase in the ERC as evidence of an increase in 
the perceived credibility of reported earnings. I control for known determinants of the ERC 
such as risk, growth, earnings persistence and other factors (Wilson 2008). 
           To measure analysts’ perception of the quality of accounting information, I test the 
effect of disclosure on DISP. Lang and Lundholm (1996) reason that reliance on individual 
analyst’s private information in the forecasting process will result in greater belief 
dispersion among analysts; thus, more reliance on high quality common information in 
publicly available financial reports will result in lower dispersion among analysts. I assess 
analysts’ perceived credibility by measuring analysts’ forecast dispersion, measured as the 
standard deviation of analyst forecasts of annual earnings divided by end of year stock 
price. I expect that analyst forecast dispersion (DISP) will decrease once they have more 
public information about audit committee activities. 
4.1.2 Voluntary disclosure of audit committee activities 
 To capture the voluntary disclosure about the audit committee’s work, the first step 
is to identify the change in disclosure relative to the disclosure regulation regime. As 
discussed earlier, the current regulatory requirements of the audit committee’s disclosure 
are documented in Item 407 of Regulation S-K and SOX 2002. The disclosure requirement 
has four parts, including certain statements about the audit committee’s responsibilities, 
the characteristics and structure of the audit committee, contents regarding pre-approval of 
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services and audit fees, and contents regarding the proposal to ratify selection of 
independent auditors.  
 Based on the published trends in voluntary disclosure (CAQ reports 2014–2016), 
the SEC’s conceptual release (2015), and the literature on the audit committee oversight 
process (Beasley et al. 2009), I categorize the voluntary disclosure into three dimensions 
of audit committee activities, namely, (i) annual review and evaluation of auditors, (ii) 
factors considered for the selection of auditors, including the tenure of the engagement 
partner, and (iii) the audit committee’s involvement in the selection of the engagement 
partner.  
I create lists of words that refer to these dimensions of disclosure. After reading 
numerous proxy statements, I compile three lists of keywords that most commonly appear 
in proxy statements for each dimension of audit committee activities as follows: (i) “Audit 
committee,” “Annual,” “Review,” “Performance,” “Responsibility,” “Appoint,” 
“Independent,” “Auditor,”; (ii) “Audit committee,” “consider,” “Factors,” “Capability,” 
“Knowledge,” “Expertise,” “Quality,” “Independence,” “Appoint,”; (iii) “Audit 
committee,” “Engagement partner,” “Appoint,” “Change,” “Rotate”. I also include 
common variations of these words as keywords, e.g., “independence” in place of 
“independent.”  For the keywords “Review”, “Appoint” and “Auditor” in the list, I use 
multiple substitutes that have similar meaning. “Discuss” and “Assess” are used as 
substitutes for “Review,” if “Review” is not found. “Engage,” “Retain,” and “Select” are 
used as substitutes for “Appoint,” if “Appoint” is not found. “Accounting firm” is used as 
a substitute for “Auditor”. I report the complete list of keywords for each dimension in 
Appendix 1. 
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 I electronically process audit committees’ textual disclosures in proxy statements 
included in the SEC’s Edgar DEF 14 filings. For each firm-year, I use textual analysis 
technique to search the proxy statement for keywords listed under each dimension of audit 
committee activities as explained above. If the search reveals that all keywords (or their 
variations and substitutes) listed under a particular dimension are included in a block of ten 
consecutive sentences of the proxy statement, I classify the observation as disclosing that 
dimension. I exclude keywords if they appear in conjunction with the keyword “charter” 
because these disclosures are required by the audit committee’s charter. I then assign a 
value of one to an indicator variable for the disclosure of dimension (i) if there is a sentence 
that is extracted as above, zero otherwise. I verify the accuracy of this procedure by 
physically reading through a set of randomly selected proxy statements, revealing an 
accuracy rate of above 80%. In Appendix 2, I provide a specific example of voluntary 
disclosure of audit committee activities included in the 2014 proxy statement of Lam 
Research Corp. 
The primary measure of disclosure used in my analyses is an indicator variable 
(Disclose1) that equals one if any of the three dimensions is disclosed by the firm, and zero 
otherwise. To further explore the link between the contents of the disclosure and the ERC, 
I test the effect of each dimension of disclosure on the ERC separately. In addition to the 
disclosure/non-disclosure decision, I also construct a variable that scores the number of 
dimensions of audit committee activities disclosed by a firm on a scale of 1 to 3, to capture 
the magnitude of the disclosure.   
  
4.2 Sample and descriptive statistics  
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 The sample selection procedure is detailed in Table 1, Panel A. My initial sample 
includes all U.S. public companies with the required data available on Compustat, CRSP 
and I/B/E/S, from fiscal years 2003 to 2015. The audit committee disclosures in DEF 14A 
proxy statements are downloaded from EDGAR SEC filings. Board characteristics are 
obtained from Execucomp. Data about Audit committee financial expertise is hand 
collected. I exclude utilities (SIC code from 4000 to 4999), financial services (SIC code 
6000 to 6999), and public administration (SIC code equal to or larger than 9000) industries 
because these industries are subject to different regulatory disclosure requirements. After 
applying these filters, the final sample of disclosers includes 8,976 firm-years representing 
1,019 distinct firms.  
           Table 1, Panel B, presents the descriptive statistics of all main variables for the full 
sample. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% of their distributions. 
Appendix 1 describes variable definitions. Panel B shows that 5.6% of firm-years disclose 
information about audit committee activities. The table also shows that 81.7% percent of 
firms are Big 4 clients. There might be a concern about the audit quality variation across 
Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors. However, it is not obvious from theory or intuition that Big 
4 firms should be superior to non-Big 4 firms in terms of audit quality. For example, 
Lawrence et al. (2011) find that the effect of Big 4 auditors on audit quality is 
insignificantly different from that of non-Big 4 firms after controlling for the characteristics 
of audit clients.  
 I use an entropy balancing technique to obtain a matched control sample of non-
disclosing firms based on a model of the determinants of the disclosure decision. Entropy 
balancing is a quasi-matching approach that weights each observation such that post-
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weighting distributional properties of treatment and control observations are virtually 
identical, thus ensuring covariate balance (Hainmueller 2012; Mcmullin and Schonberger 
2015). The weights assigned to each control observation at the end of the iteration 
procedure are then used in the regression process. There are some advantages to using 
entropy balancing rather than the commonly-used propensity-matching approach. First, 
since different firms begin to disclose audit committee activities in different years and then 
stop disclosing at some point of time, the assumption of a “parallel trend” is most likely 
not satisfied. Second, entropy balancing mitigates sample attrition that may occur when 
using propensity-matching. However, to rule out the concern regarding the comparability 
of the treatment and control samples that may arise from entropy balancing, I also analyze 
the sample matched by propensity-matching as a robustness check. 
  I model the disclosure decision on the basis of several factors that capture 
information demand and corporate governance. In order to determine what factors affect 
firms’ disclosure decision, I conduct an analysis of the determinants of the disclosure 
decision. I estimate a probit regression of Disclose1 on potential variables that may 
influence firms’ disclosure decision. I expect large firms and growth stocks to be more 
likely to disclose because of the greater information demand from market participants. I 
also expect more risky firms to disclose in order to inform equity and debtholders about 
the effectiveness of their corporate governance. In order to isolate the effect of audit 
committee disclosure on perceived versus actual improvement in accounting quality, I 
include a measure of accounting quality. I include institutional ownership as a factor since 
anecdotal evidence suggests that institutional investors demand more information on audit 
committee activities. I include Big4 because firms audited by big four accounting firms 
20 
 
may be more likely to disclose since they arguably have higher accounting quality. 
Relatedly, I also expect that firms may change the level of disclosure when they change 
accounting firms. Thus, I include auditor change as a factor. I expect firms with larger 
board size as more likely to disclose since previous results show that board size has a 
positive effect on voluntary disclosure. I also include CEO age and CEO tenure as factors 
because research suggests a strong relationship between CEO characteristics and firms’ 
disclosure behavior. As the results show in Table 2, size, institutional ownership, board 
size, auditor change, and loss significantly affect firms’ disclosure decision. I then include 
all these variables plus other control variables that affect ERC in the entropy balancing 
procedure.   
 I analyze the distributional properties (mean and variance) for the disclosing sample 
and the control sample in Table 3. Panel A shows the distributional properties of disclosers 
and non-disclosers before the entropy balancing process. There are significant differences 
in the mean and variance of some of the characteristics before entropy balancing, such as 
Size, MTB, leverage and loss. After entropy balancing, as shown in Panel B, the differences 
of means and variances between disclosers and non-disclosers are trivial and insignificant. 
The weights assigned to each control observation at the end of the iteration process in 
entropy balancing are then used in the subsequent regression analysis.  
 
4.3 Voluntary disclosure and perceived credibility of financial reporting 
4.3.1 Research design 
 In this section, I discuss the empirical approach to examine the effect of voluntary 
disclosure of the audit committee’s activities on the credibility of financial reporting. I use 
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two proxies for perceived credibility of financial reporting, ERC and analysts’ forecast 
dispersion (DISP). I employ a difference-in-differences research design to evaluate the 
change in ERC and DISP in the post-disclosure period. I use the three years preceding the 
initial disclosure year as the pre-disclosure period and the years following the initial 
disclosure year as the post-disclosure period. The post-disclosure period does not include 
the year in which the firm discontinues disclosure and years thereafter. I compare the 
sample of disclosers with the entropy-balanced matched control sample of non-disclosers. 
To test the effect of audit committee disclosure on ERC, I estimate a regression of 3-day 
cumulative market-adjusted returns (CAR) on earnings surprise (relative to the prevailing 
analyst consensus) using the treatment sample of disclosers and the matched control sample 
of non-disclosers. The regression model is as follows: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 
               𝛽4 ∗ 𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 
               𝛽7 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽𝑚 ∗  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝐸 + ℰ𝑖𝑡                                                    (1)                                     
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the 3-day cumulative market-adjusted stock return around the date of the 
annual earnings announcement. 𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡  is the unexpected earnings, calculated as the 
difference between the I/B/E/S actual annual EPS and the most recent median consensus 
I/B/E/S forecast in a window beginning 95 days and ending three days prior to the earnings 
announcement, scaled by the price two days prior to the earnings announcement (Gipper 
et al. 2015). 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 is an indicator variable which equals one if a firm belongs to the 
sample of disclosers and zero if a firm belongs to the control sample. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 is an indicator 
variable which equals one for year t, the disclosure initiation year, and the following years 
until the disclosure is discontinued. The same indicator variable, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 , is assigned to 
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control firms that are matched with a disclosing firm (i.e., pseudo-post years are assigned 
to control firms). The main variable of interest is 𝛽1, the coefficient on 𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡, which captures the change in ERC for disclosing firms relative to non-disclosing 
firms, from the pre-disclosure to the post-disclosure period. If the audit committee 
disclosure improves the credibility of reported earnings, 𝛽1 should be significantly positive.  
 Following the literature on ERC, I include several control variables and their 
interaction with UE (e.g., Wilson 2008, and Gipper et al. 2015). Consistent with prior 
research, ERC is expected to be positively associated with earnings persistence and 
negatively associated with risk (e.g., Easton and Zmijewski 1989, and Collins and Kothari 
1989). Thus, I include earnings persistence (Persistence), firm size (Size), market beta 
(Beta), and leverage (Leverage) as control variables. I also include a loss indicator (Loss), 
following Hayn (1995) and Basu (1997), and the market-to-book ratio (MTB) following 
Easton and Zmijewski (1989). I include Big4 (Big4) as a control variable because Big 4 
audit firms are arguably perceived as providing higher quality audits and enhanced 
assurance on financial statements relative to non-big 4 audit firms (e.g., Teoh and Wong 
1993, and Lawrence et al. 2011). Relatedly, I expect that firms’ perceived accounting 
quality may change when they change audit firms. Thus I include auditor change (Auditor 
change) as a control variable. I include financial expertise (Financial expertise) as a control 
variable because prior research suggests that audit committee financial expertise improves 
oversight of the financial reporting process and is negatively associated with indicators of 
poor financial reporting (e.g., Abbott et al. 2004, Dhaliwal et al. 2010, and Cohen et al. 
2014). To isolate the effect of audit committee disclosures on the perceived versus actual 
improvement in accounting quality, I include a measure of accounting quality (AQ) as a 
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control variable. I include board size (Board size), CEO age and CEO tenure as proxies for 
board quality to control for their effect on the credibility of financial reporting. This is 
consistent with prior research that shows that board and CEO characteristics affect the 
financial accounting process and earnings quality (e.g., Klein 2002b, Anderson et al. 2003, 
and Ali and Zhang 2014). In addition, to show that the increase in ERC is due to the 
disclosure content about audit committee activities rather than the length of the proxy 
statement, I include the number of words in the proxy statement (Length) as a control 
variable. The regression is estimated with industry and year fixed effects and standard 
errors are clustered by year.9  
            To test the effect of audit committee disclosure on DISP, I estimate a regression of 
DISP on a set of control variables using the treatment sample of disclosers and the matched 
control sample of non-disclosers. For consistency, I use the same controls as in the ERC 
model. The regression model is as follows: 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 +
                 𝛽𝑚 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝐸 + ℰ𝑖𝑡                                                       (2) 
4.3.2   Results of the effect of voluntary disclosure on ERC 
 Table 4 reports the results of regression (1) with alternative measures of Disclose. 
In column (1), Disclose is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm discloses any of 
the three dimensions of audit committee activities mentioned in section 2, otherwise zero. 
In column (2), Disclose is an indicator variable that captures the most important oversight 
task of the audit committee and equals one if firms disclose information about the first 
dimension, i.e., whether the audit committee performs an annual review and evaluation of 
                                                          
9 The results are robust to the inclusion of firm and year fixed effects. 
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the auditor’s work, otherwise zero. In column (3), Disclose is an indicator variable that 
equals one if firms disclose information about the second dimension, i.e., whether the audit 
committee considers multiple factors for auditor ratification process, otherwise zero. In 
column (4), Disclose is the number of dimensions that a firm discloses ranging from 1 to 3 
and represents the magnitude of disclosure.  
 In column (1), 𝛽1, the difference-in-differences coefficient on UE*Disclose*Post, 
is positive at 0.395 and significant at the 1% level. Consistent with my hypothesis, this 
result suggests that, relative to non-disclosers, the ERC of disclosers is significantly higher 
after the initiation of voluntary audit committee disclosure. To assess the economic 
magnitude of the coefficients, I follow Kothari (2001) and other studies about reporting 
credibility (e.g. Gipper et al. 2015) and calculate the change in a firm’s cost of equity 
capital leading to an equivalent change in firm value as the change in the ERC. I use 10% 
as a benchmark cost of capital and assume that the earnings surprise is a shock to future 
cash flows that persists in perpetuity. Using this approach, the coefficient in column (1) is 
as large as a change in firm value due to a decline in the cost of capital by about 38 basis 
points.10  As a comparison, Wilson (2008) and Chen et al. (2014) document a decline in 
ERC following restatements, which implies a 32-70 basis points change in firm value due 
to a change in the cost of capital. Thus, the magnitude of my estimates is meaningful and 
comparable with other studies about financial reporting credibility. As expected, the 
coefficient on UE, 𝛽2, is positive and significant. In columns (2) and (3), 𝛽1 is positive and 
significant at 0.386 and 0.375, respectively, suggesting that the ERC increases with the 
                                                          
10 I calculate the change in cost of capital as follows: Assuming a cost of capital of 10%, the benchmark ERC 
is 11 (1/.10+1) (e.g., Kothari, 2001). Thus, the 38-basis point decline in cost of capital is calculated as 0.1000 
– 0.0962, where 0.0962 is the cost of capital implied by an increase in the ERC of 0.395 (1/r+1=11 + 0.395). 
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disclosure of the first dimension of audit committee activities (i.e., annual review and 
evaluation of the auditor’s work) and with the disclosure of the second dimension of audit 
committee activities (i.e., factors considered in auditor selection). In column (4), 𝛽1 is 
positive at 0.411 and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the ERC increases with 
the number of dimensions of disclosure. In terms of the average economic magnitude, the 
coefficients in column (1) to column (4) are as large as a change in firm value due to a 
decline in the cost of capital by about 38 basis points.11 Thus, Table 4 shows that the ERC 
increases significantly after the initiation of voluntary disclosure of audit committee 
activities and this increase is robust across all four measures of disclosure. In all columns, 
most control variables interacted with UE have the expected signs based on prior research. 
The coefficients on the interacted control variables indicate that size, persistence and beta 
are positively associated and loss is negatively associated with ERC. Collectively, these 
results suggest that the voluntary disclosure of audit committee activities improves the 
credibility of financial reporting and enhances investor confidence. 
4.3.3   Cross-sectional analyses of the impact on ERC 
 In order to explore settings that are likely to be associated with higher investor 
credibility in response to audit committee disclosures, I conduct two sets of cross-sectional 
analyses. I predict that the effect of disclosure on financial reporting credibility will be 
more pronounced when a firm’s information environment is weak in general. Since, 
investors have lower credibility in the financial reporting of firms with a weaker 
information environment, the greatest impact of additional disclosures will accrue to these 
                                                          
11 I also test the effect on ERC of the disclosure of the third dimension of audit committee activities (i.e., 
selection criteria for the engagement partner); however the results are insignificant, likely due to the small 
number of firms disclosing the third dimension of audit committee activities. 
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investors. I use two proxies to measure information environment -- analyst coverage and 
return volatility. A growing literature cites analyst coverage as an important indicator of 
the information environment (e.g., Harford et al. 2016). Thus, I expect to find that ERC of 
disclosers is incrementally greater for firms covered by fewer financial analysts. Volatile 
stock returns are an indicator of higher uncertainty in the information environment (Barry 
1978, Brown 1979, and Billings et al. 2015). Thus, I expect an incrementally higher ERC 
for disclosers with higher return volatility.  
 Analyst coverage is measured by the number of analysts following a firm, 
specifically, the number of unique analysts who issue at least one forecast on I/B/E/S in 
the window beginning 360 days and ending 3 days prior to an earnings announcement. 
When no forecasts are observed, the count is set to zero. The variable 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 is an 
indicator variable that equals one if the firm has above-median analyst following in the 
disclosure year, and zero otherwise. The variable 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 is also an indicator variable 
which equals one if the firm has return volatility above the sample median in the disclosure 
year, and zero otherwise.   
 Table 5 presents the results of cross-sectional analysis based on return volatility 
and analyst following, using Disclose1 as the variable of interest. Columns (1) to (3), report 
the regression results for the subsamples of below-median and above-median analyst 
following. 𝛽1, the coefficient estimate on the interaction variable UE*Disclose*Post, is 
0.568 for firms with low analyst following and 0.320 for firms with higher analyst 
following. Moreover, the difference in 𝛽1 of the two subsamples is 0.248, significant at the 
1% level, indicating that firms with fewer analysts experience an incrementally higher 
increase in ERC after the initiation of voluntary disclosure of audit committee activities. In 
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terms of the economic magnitude, the difference in the decline in cost of capital is 22 basis 
points. Columns (4) to (6), present the results for the subsamples of below-median and 
above-median return volatility. Again, 𝛽1, the coefficient of interest, is 0.172 and 0.395 for 
firms with low return volatility and high volatility, respectively. Further, the difference in 
𝛽1 of the two subsamples is 0.223, and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that firms 
with high return volatility experience an incrementally higher increase in ERC after the 
initiation of voluntary disclosure. 
 To summarize, the ERC of disclosers is incrementally greater for firms with lower 
analyst following and more volatile stock returns, suggesting that firms with a weaker 
information environment experience a greater increase in ERC when they disclose 
information about their audit committee’s oversight activities. 
4.3.4   Results of the effect of voluntary disclosure on DISP 
            Table 6 reports the results of regression (1) with alternative measures of Disclose 
consistent with those reported in Table 4. In column (1), 𝛽1, the difference-in-differences 
coefficient on Disclose*Post, is negative at -0.001 and significant at the 1% level. 
Consistent with my hypothesis, this result suggests that, relative to non-disclosers, analysts’ 
dispersion of disclosers is significantly lower after the initiation of voluntary audit 
committee disclosure and the dispersion declines by 1%. In columns (2) and (3), 𝛽1 is 
negative and significant at -0.001 and -0.003, respectively, suggesting that DISP decreases 
with the disclosure of the first dimension of audit committee activities (i.e., annual review 
and evaluation of the auditor’s work) and with the disclosure of the second dimension of 
audit committee activities (i.e., factors considered in auditor selection). In columns (4), 𝛽1 
is negative at -0.003 and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that DISP decreases with 
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the number of dimensions of disclosure. Thus, Table 6 shows that DISP decreases 
significantly after the initiation of voluntary disclosure and this decrease is robust to all 
four measures of voluntary disclosure. In all columns, most control variables have the 
expected signs based on prior research. Collectively, these results suggest that the 
voluntary disclosure of audit committee activities enhances analysts’ perceived credibility 
of financial reporting. 
4.3.5   Cross-sectional analyses of the impact on DISP 
           Similar to the cross sectional analysis on the impact of disclosure on ERC, I test the 
impact of the information environment on the incremental change in DISP after the 
disclosure. I expect an incrementally lower DISP for disclosers with higher return volatility 
and low analyst coverage. 
 Table 7 presents the results of cross-sectional analysis based on return volatility 
and analyst following, using Disclose1 as the variable of interest. Columns (1) to (3) report 
the regression results for the subsamples of below-median and above-median analyst 
following. 𝛽1, the coefficient estimate on the interaction variable Disclose*Post, is -0.003 
for firms with lower analyst following and -0.001 for firms with greater analyst following. 
Moreover, the difference in 𝛽1 of the two subsamples is -0.002, significant at the 1% level, 
indicating that firms with fewer analysts experience an incrementally higher decrease in 
DISP after the initiation of voluntary disclosure of audit committee’s activities. Columns 
(4) to (6) present the results for the subsamples of below-median and above-median return 
volatility. Again, 𝛽1, the coefficient of interest, is -0.000 and -0.002 for firms with low 
return volatility and high return volatility, respectively. Further, the difference in 𝛽1 of the 
two subsamples is -0.002, significant at the 1% level, suggesting that firms with high return 
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volatility experience an incrementally higher decrease in DISP after the initiation of 
voluntary disclosure. 
 To summarize, analysts’ dispersion of disclosers is incrementally lower for firms 
with lower analyst following and more volatile stock returns, suggesting that firms with 
weaker information environment experience a higher decrease in dispersion when they 
disclose information about their audit committee’s oversight activities. 
 
4.4   Impact of accounting quality change on ERC and DISP 
 Based on the results thus far, I interpret the increase in post-disclosure ERC and 
decrease in post-disclosure DISP as the effect of audit committee disclosures enhancing 
the credibility of financial reporting as perceived by investors and analysts. It is also 
possible that when the firm decides to disclose audit committee activities, it simultaneously 
improves the audit committee’s oversight role which in turn improves the actual quality of 
financial reporting, not just the investors’ perception of quality. Thus, the observed increase 
in ERC and decrease in DISP after the disclosure could potentially be driven by an increase 
in earnings quality due to an improvement in audit committee monitoring. I examine 
whether the higher ERC (or lower DISP) in the post-disclosure period is due to an increase 
in investor credibility or an improvement in earnings quality. I construct two sets of tests. 
First I examine whether the actual earnings quality changed from the pre- to the post-
disclosure period. I estimate the following regression: 
          𝐴𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 
                               + 𝛽𝑚 ∗  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝐸 + ℰ𝑖𝑡                                                          (3)
 I use two measures of accounting quality, 𝐴𝑄𝑖𝑡, (i) performance-matched 
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discretionary accruals used by Kothari et al. (2005), and (ii) accruals quality measured as 
a combination of the residual from the accruals model in Dechow and Dichev (2002) and 
abnormal accruals from the modified Jones model (McNichols 2002). The details of these 
measures are provided in Appendix 1. The independent variable of interest in regression 
(3) is Disclose*Post, using Disclose1 as the disclosure variable.  If the change in ERC and 
DISP are not due to a change in accounting quality, then 𝛽1 should be insignificant. Table 
8, Panel A, column (1), reports results of change in AQ around the initial disclosure using 
performance-matched discretionary accruals by Kothari et al. (2005) and column (2) 
reports results of change in accrual quality using the measure in McNichols (2002). The 
results show that the coefficients on the interaction term Disclose*Post are not significant 
in both columns, which suggests that there is no significant change in accounting quality 
in the post disclosure period for disclosing firms relative to non-disclosing firms.12 
 In addition to the test in equation (3), I also estimate regressions (1) and (2) using 
sub-samples based on change in accounting quality. First, I calculate the change in 
accounting quality around the initiation of disclosure (from year -1 to +1). Second, I rank 
the change in accounting quality - Kothari et al. (2005) and change in accounting quality - 
McNichols (2002) and classify firms into two groups – high versus low change in 
accounting quality. I then run regressions (1) and (2) separately for these groups and test 
for the difference in 𝛽1 between the two groups. If accounting quality change is not the 
                                                          
12 I also examine the robustness of my results with respect to alternative measures of accounting quality. I 
examine the change in accounting quality based on abnormal accruals from the modified Jones model 
(Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 1995) and growth-adjusted discretionary accruals (Collins, Pungaliya and Vijh 
2017). The coefficients of the interaction term Disclose*Post using these alternative measures of accounting 
quality are insignificant, consistent with the results in Panel A of Table 8.  
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driver of the ERC change and DISP change, I expect to find an insignificant difference 
between the two 𝛽1s.  
              Table 8, Panel B, presents the ERC results for the subsamples of change in the 
two accounting quality measures (AQ). Columns (1) and (4) report results for the sample 
with below-median AQ and columns (2) and (5) report results for the sample with above-
median AQ. In both columns, the coefficient estimates on UE*Disclose*Post, 𝛽1, are 
positive and significant. Column (3) presents results of the test of difference in coefficients 
reported in columns (1) and (2), and column (6) presents results of the test of difference in 
coefficients reported in columns (4) and (5). From the t-value results reported columns (3) 
and (6), the difference in 𝛽1 between columns (1) and (2) and that between columns (4) 
and (5) are insignificant, suggesting that change in accounting quality does not impact the 
increase in ERC. Thus, the incremental increase in ERC in the post disclosure period is 
more likely due to enhanced credibility rather than an improvement in accounting quality. 
Combining this with the results in Table 4, I conclude that the voluntary disclosure of audit 
committee oversight activities improves investors’ confidence in financial reporting and 
thus enhances the credibility of accounting information. 
            Table 8, Panel C, presents the DISP results for the subsamples of change in the two 
accounting quality measures (AQ). Columns (1) and (4) report results for the sample with 
below-median AQ and columns (2) and (5) report results for the sample with above-
median AQ. In both columns, the coefficient estimates on Disclose*Post, 𝛽1, are negative 
and significant. Similar to Panel B, from the t-value results reported columns (3) and (6), 
the difference in 𝛽1 between columns (1) and (2) is insignificant and the difference in 𝛽1 
between columns (4) and (5) is insignificant, suggesting that change in accounting quality 
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does not impact the decrease in DISP. Thus, the incremental decrease in DISP in the post 
disclosure period is more likely due to enhanced credibility rather than an improvement in 
accounting quality. Combining this with the results in Table 6, I conclude that the voluntary 
disclosure of audit committee oversight activities provides more information to analysts 
and enhances their perceived credibility of financial reporting.  
 
4.5   Impact of discontinuance of voluntary disclosure on ERC 
 The results thus far show that ERC is higher after the initiation of voluntary 
disclosure about audit committee activities. In this section, I examine whether ERC 
decreases when a firm discontinues voluntary disclosure. I consider a firm to have 
discontinued disclosure when there is no disclosure about any of the three dimensions of 
audit committee activities. Using a sample that includes three years prior to the 
discontinuance of disclosure (pre-period) and all years thereafter (POST), I estimate the 
following regression: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 
                 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 
                 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 
               + 𝛽𝑚 ∗  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝐸 + ℰ𝑖𝑡                                          (4)  
The variable Discontinue is an indicator variable that equals one for the treatment sample 
of disclosers and zero for non-disclosers. Consistent with my expectation, Table 9, column 
(1), shows that the coefficient estimate on the interaction variable UE*Discontinue*Post is 
-0.285 significant at the 10% level. Thus, the ERC incrementally decreases after the firm 
discontinues voluntary disclosure about audit committee activities. This result adds 
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corroborating support for the effect of voluntary disclosure of audit committee activities 
on the ERC.13 
 Similar to the analysis in section 4.3.3, I also conduct a cross-sectional analysis on 
the change in ERC after the discontinuance of voluntary disclosure by examining 
subsamples based on return volatility. Table 9, columns (2) to (4), report the regression 
results for the subsamples of above-median and below-median return volatility. 𝛽1, the 
coefficient estimate on the interaction variable UE*Discontinue*Post, is -0.353 for firms 
with high return volatility, which is significant at the 5% level, and -0.240 for firms with 
low return volatility. Moreover, the difference in 𝛽1  of the two subsamples is 0.113, 
significant at the 5% level, indicating that firms with high return volatility experience an 
incrementally higher decrease in ERC after the discontinuance of voluntary disclosure of 
audit committee’s activities. 14  Thus, firms with a weaker information environment 
experience a greater decrease in ERC when they discontinue disclosure about their audit 
committee’s oversight activities. 
          Similar to the analysis in section 4.4, I examine whether the decrease in ERC is due 
to a decrease in accounting quality due to the discontinuance of voluntary disclosure. To 
examine whether accounting quality decreases after the discontinuance of the voluntary 
disclosure, I estimate the following regression: 
          𝐴𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 
                        + 𝛽𝑚 ∗  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝐸 + ℰ𝑖𝑡                                                                   (5)                                                                                  
                                                          
13 I also examine the impact of discontinuance of voluntary disclosure on analysts’ forecast dispersion 
(DISP). However, in the regression of DISP on 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡  and other variables, the coefficient, 
𝛽1, on 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 is positive as expected but insignificant (t value=1.17).   
14 I obtain similar (albeit weaker) results when the subsamples are based on analyst following as a proxy for 
the information environment (untabulated). The difference in 𝛽1 of the subsamples of low versus high 
analyst following is 0.135 (p-value=0.128).   
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Table 10, Panel A, reports results using performance-matched discretionary accruals 
measure by Kothari et al. (2005) in column (1) and accrual quality by McNichols (2002) 
in column (2). The coefficient estimates on the interaction variable Discontinue*Post are 
insignificant in both columns, suggesting that there is no significant change in accounting 
quality around the time of discontinuance of disclosure. 
 To examine whether the decrease in ERC post discontinuance of disclosure is 
driven by a decrease in accounting quality and not simply a decrease in credibility, I 
estimate regression (4) for subsamples based on change in accounting quality (AQ). Table 
10, Panel B, column (1) reports results for the sample with below-median AQ and column 
(2) reports results for the sample with above-median AQ. In both columns,  𝛽1 , the 
coefficient estimate on UE*Discontinue*Post, is negative and significant. From the t-value 
results reported in column (3), the difference in 𝛽1  between columns (1) and (2) is 
insignificant (t=-0.76), suggesting that the change in accounting quality does not impact 
the decrease in ERC. Thus, the decrease in ERC in the post discontinuance period is more 
likely due to decreased credibility rather than a decrease in accounting quality. Combined 
with the results in Table 9, my results suggest that the discontinuance of voluntary 
disclosure of audit committee oversight activities decreases investors’ confidence in the 
firm’s financial reporting and reduces the credibility of their accounting information. 
 
4.6   Sensitivity analyses 
4.6.1 Results from propensity score-matching method 
  First, in addition to using entropy-balancing techniques to obtain a control sample 
of non-disclosers matched on observable characteristics, I conduct the same analysis on 
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disclosers and non-disclosers matched using the propensity score-matching process (PSM). 
The matched sample is obtained using PSM over a panel of pre-disclosure firm-years. I 
perform PSM without replacement and allow for up to three matches per discloser. From 
Table 11, column Diff shows that, for most variables, there is no significant difference 
between the treatment and control samples before the disclosure initiation year.  
           I estimate regressions (1) and (2) on the sample based on PSM. Table 12 shows the 
results of the impact of voluntary disclosure on ERC and DISP. Table 12, Panel A, shows 
that, 𝛽1, the difference-in-differences coefficient on UE*Disclose*Post, is positive and 
significant at the 1% level in all columns. Consistent with my hypothesis, this result 
suggests that, relative to non-disclosers, the ERC of disclosers is significantly higher after 
the initiation of voluntary audit committee disclosure. As expected, the coefficient on UE, 
𝛽2, are all positive and significant. These results are consistent with the results from entropy 
balancing, and suggest that the ERC increases with the disclosure of audit committee 
activities. 
          Table 12, Panel B, shows that, 𝛽1, the difference-in-differences coefficient on 
Disclose*Post, is negative and significant in all columns. Consistent with my hypothesis 
and the results from entropy-balancing (reported in Table 6), this result suggests that 
analysts’ dispersion decreases with the disclosure of audit committee activities. 
4.6.2 Other robustness tests   
            While my main analyses includes change in auditors as an independent variable to 
control for its impact on ERC and DISP, I conduct an alternative test by excluding 
observations in auditor change years from the sample. I drop 140 firm-years that 
experienced an auditor change. Un-tabulated results show that the coefficient on 
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UE*Disclose*Post continues to remain positive and significant (at the 1% level) in tests of 
the impact of voluntary disclosure on ERC, and the coefficient on Disclose*Post continues 
to remain negative and significant (at the 1% level) in tests of the impact of voluntary 
disclosure on DISP. 
 
5.   Conclusion 
 In recent years, various stakeholders have expressed concern about the lack of 
transparency in how audit committees execute their responsibilities. To enhance investor 
confidence in financial reporting, companies have started voluntarily providing additional 
task-oriented information about the audit committee oversight process, beyond the limited 
regulatory requirement. Using textual analysis technique to capture disclosure strength, I 
test whether these narrative disclosures improve investors’ perceived credibility in firms’ 
reported earnings, captured by the earnings response coefficient (ERC). I test whether these 
narrative disclosures improve analysts’ perceived credibility in firms’ reported earnings, 
captured by the analyst forecast dispersion (DISP). I predict that voluntary disclosure of 
audit committee oversight activities will increase ERC and decrease DISP. 
 I find that, relative to a matched control sample of non-disclosing firms, the ERC 
of the sample of disclosers is significantly higher after the voluntary disclosure of audit 
committee activities and this effect increases with the number of dimensions of audit 
committee tasks disclosed. Further, cross-sectional analysis shows that the increase in ERC 
after the disclosure is incrementally greater for firms with a weaker information 
environment, captured by financial analysts’ coverage and return volatility in the disclosure 
year. I also find that, relative to a matched control sample of non-disclosing firms, the DISP 
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of the sample of disclosers is significantly lower after the voluntary disclosure of audit 
committee activities and this effect increases with the number of dimensions of audit 
committee tasks disclosed, and is incrementally greater for firms with a weaker information 
environment, captured by analysts’ coverage and return volatility in the disclosure year.           
 This paper sheds light on the effect of transparent disclosures about the audit 
committee on market participants’ perception about financial reporting. It provides timely 
evidence that could be of interest to the SEC in view of its expressed intent to revisit the 
mandating of audit committee disclosures. 
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Table 1    Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A: Sample selection procedure 
 
Sample selection procedure Time range N  
Firm-year observations with Compustat data   1992-2016 242,562 
Exclude observations with SIC codes 4000-4999, 6000-6999, ≥9000 1992-2016 184,381 
Exclude missing values of key fundamentals 1992-2016 153,960 
Missing earnings persistence measure (requires 10 years of data to 
calculate)  
 
2002-2016 60,112 
Missing earnings surprise, dispersion, volatility calculated by using 
data from I/B/E/S and  CRSP 
 
2003-2016 27,251 
Missing audit committee disclosure data from SEC's Edgar DEF 14 
filings 
 
2003-2015 21,323 
Missing data for accounting quality calculation and institutional 
ownership from Thomson Reuters 
 
 
2003-2015 15,860 
Missing audit committee financial expertise and board variables 
restricted to Execucomp firms 
 
2003-2015 10,270 
Final sample: 2003-2015   
 Sample of disclosers and matched control sample of non-disclosers   8,976 
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Panel B: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev P25 Median P75 
CAR 8,976 0.007 0.090 -0.040 0.006 0.056 
UE 8,976 -0.002 0.032 -0.001 0.001 0.003 
DISP 8,976 0.011 0.055 0.001 0.003 0.008 
Disclose 8,976 0.037 0.190 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Size 8,976 6.915 1.512 5.845 6.829 7.884 
Market-to-Book 8,976 3.515 6.012 1.404 2.185 3.578 
Loss 8,976 0.205 0.404 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Leverage 8,976 0.646 2.035 0.000 0.237 0.675 
Beta 8,976 1.243 0.416 0.973 1.227 1.502 
Persistence 8,976 0.357 0.405 0.079 0.356 0.615 
Big4 8,976 0.817 0.385 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Auditor change 8,976 0.127 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Nonlinear 8,976 -0.001 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Institutional 
ownership 
8,976 0.786 0.241 0.667 0.845 0.951 
Financial expertise 8,976 0.598 0.293 0.333 0.600 1.000 
Board size 8,976 8.641 2.780 7.000 8.000 10.000 
CEO age 8,976 55.819 6.959 47.000 56.000 60.000 
CEO Tenure 8,976 4.953 8.201 1.000 3.000 9.000 
Length 8,976 9.965 0.632 9.548 10.017 10.377 
AQ 8,976 0.065 0.154 0.015 0.036 0.072 
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the main analyses. The sample covers 
the period 2003-2015. The descriptive statistics relate to disclosing and non-disclosing matched 
control firms over the sample period beginning three years before the disclosing firm’s initial 
disclosure until the discontinuance of disclosure or the end of 2015 whichever is earlier. Variables 
are defined in Appendix 1. 
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Table 2   Determinants of voluntary disclosure 
 
Dependent variable: Disclose   
  Probit Linear 
  (1) (2) 
Size 0.309*** 0.180*** 
  (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
MTB -0.004 -0.000 
  (0.818) (0.813) 
Loss -0.019 -0.046** 
  (0.11) (0.038) 
Leverage 0.001 0.000 
  (0.824) (0.658) 
Beta -0.050 -0.016 
  (0.625) (0.387) 
Persistence 0.069 0.019 
  (0.425) (0.311) 
Big4 0.018 0.019 
  (0.955) (0.276) 
Auditor change 0.497** 0.050** 
 (0.024) (0.024) 
Institutional ownership 0.698*** 0.216** 
  (0.001) (0.023) 
Financial expertise 0.016 0.009 
 (0.290) (0.301) 
Board size 0.106*** 0.025*** 
 (0.000) (<0.0001) 
CEO age -0.016** -0.002* 
 (0.014) (0.099) 
CEO tenure -0.013** -0.001 
 (0.039) (0.1185) 
AQ 0.098 0.202 
  (0.214) (0.118) 
N 8,976 8,976 
Industry Fixed Effects - Yes 
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Year Fixed Effects - Yes 
 (Pseudo)R-Squared  0.150 0.171 
 
Table 2 presents the results of the determinants of the disclosure decision based on firm 
fundamentals. Disclose is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm has voluntarily disclosed 
any of the three dimensions of audit committee disclosures. Column (1) shows the coefficients and 
p-values from a probit regression, column (2) shows the coefficients and p-values from a linear 
regression including industry and year fixed effects. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
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Table 3    Pre and post-entropy balancing sample distributions 
Panel A: Original sample 
    Mean     Variance   
  
Dis 
closing 
Non-disclosing Diff 
Dis 
closing 
Non-disclosing Diff 
Size 7.833 6.84 0.993*** 3.715 2.101 1.614*** 
MTB 3.083 3.28 -0.197** 5.623 5.101 0.522** 
Loss 0.153 0.209 -0.055** 0.13 0.165 -0.035* 
Leverage 0.608 0.613 -0.005** 0.54 1.600 -1.060** 
Beta 1.18 1.247 -0.067 0.188 0.172 0.016 
Persistence 0.389 0.355 0.034 0.168 0.164 0.004 
Big4 0.93 0.813 0.118** 0.065 0.152 -0.087* 
Auditor 
change 
0.104 0.128 -0.025 0.093 0.112 -0.019 
Institutional 
ownershp 
0.775 0.786 -0.011** 0.046 0.059 -0.013* 
Financial 
expertise 
0.579 0.579 0.000 0.086 0.086 0.000 
Board size 9.1 7.425 1.675** 5.792 4.136 1.655** 
CEO age 50.377 52.082 -1.706** 5.148 5.427 -0.279* 
CEO tenure 3.494 5.404 -1.910** 6.698 7.567 -0.869* 
Length 9.974 9.963 0.011 0.429 0.395 0.034 
AQ 0.043 0.066 -0.023** 0.0032 0.025 -0.022** 
N 510 8,466         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Post entropy balancing 
    Mean     Variance   
  Disclosing Non-disclosing Diff Disclosing Non-disclosing Diff 
Size 7.833 7.831 0.002 3.715 3.712 0.003 
MTB 3.083 3.083 0.000 5.623 5.604 0.019 
Loss 0.153 0.153 0.000 0.13 0.13 0.000 
Leverage 0.608 0.608 0.000 0.54 0.538 0.002 
Beta 1.18 1.18 0.000 0.188 0.188 0.000 
Persistence 0.389 0.389 0.000 0.168 0.168 0.000 
Big4 0.93 0.929 0.001 0.065 0.065 0.000 
Auditor change 0.104 0.104 0.000 0.093 0.093 0.000 
Institutional  
ownership 
0.775 0.774 0.001 0.046 0.044 0.002 
Financial 
expertise 
0.579 0.579 0.000 0.086 0.086 0.000 
Board size 9.100 9.100 0.000 5.792 5.792 0.000 
CEO age 50.377 50.375 0.002 5.148 5.148 0.000 
CEO tenure 3.494 3.494 0.000 6.698 6.698 0.000 
Length 9.974 9.974 0.000 0.429 0.429 0.000 
AQ 0.043 0.043 0.000 0.0032 0.0032 0.000 
N 510 8,466         
 
Table 3 presents distributional properties (mean and variance) for the disclosing and non-disclosing 
firms for the original sample (Panel A) and the entropy balanced sample (Panel B). Differences 
between the means and variances are presented in the columns labeled “Diff”. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Significance levels are calculated using 
a t-test for the difference in means and F-test for the difference in variances. 
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Table 4     Impact of voluntary disclosure on ERC 
 
Dependent variable: CAR  
  Disclose 1 Disclose 2 Disclose 3 Disclose 4 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
UE*Disclose*Post 0.395*** 0.386*** 0.375*** 0.411*** 
 (2.78) （2.89） （2.64） （3.06） 
UE 0.210***  0.209*** 0.226*** 0.347*** 
 (3.04) （3.20） （3.05） （3.10） 
UE*Disclose 0.120 0.117 0.098 0.059 
 (1.20) （1.18） （1.01） （1.35） 
UE*Post 0.194 0.202 0.197 0.148 
 (0.49) （0.55） （0.61） （0.51） 
UE*Size 0.169**  0.233** 0.233** 0.237** 
 (2.01) （1.97） （2.07） （1.97） 
UE*MTB 0.050** 0.051** 0.055** 0.053** 
 (2.23) （1.97） （2.57） （2.24） 
UE*Loss -0.817**  -0.743* -0.837* -0.746* 
 (-1.96)    （-1.72） （-1.67） （-1.71） 
UE*Leverage -0.023 -0.020 -0.021 -0.019 
 (-1.05)    （-1.04） （-1.20） （-1.04） 
UE*Beta 0.718*** 0.669** 0.589 0.683* 
 (3.22)    （1.89） （1.35） （1.91） 
UE*Persistence 0.542* 0.577* 0.461* 0.567* 
 (1.90) （1.80） （1.69） （1.82） 
UE*Big4  0.541 0.493 0.477 0.428 
 (1.24)  （1.20） （1.04） （0.99） 
UE*Auditor change 0.226 0.243 0.266 0.249 
 (0.74) (0.77) (0.82) (0.79) 
UE* Institutional ownership 0.419  0.365 0.197 0.344 
 (1.27)  （1.35） （1.02） （0.73） 
UE*Financial expertise 0.013 0.010 0.015 0.010 
 (0.77) (0.82) (0.90) (1.01) 
UE*Board size -0.084 -0.071 -0.066 -0.072 
 (-1.44) (-1.04) (-0.96) (-1.11) 
UE*CEO age -0.005 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 
 (-0.21) (-0.28) (-0.42) (-0.33) 
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UE*CEO tenure -0.025 -0.023 -0.022 -0.023 
 (-1.39) (-1.25) (-1.21) (-1.24) 
UE*Length 0.444** 0.436** 0.405* 0.432** 
 (2.29) (2.03) (1.74) (2.06) 
UE*AQ 0.465 0.352 0.431 0.409 
 (0.98) （0.82） （0.69） （0.69） 
Nonlinear (=UE*|UE|) 0.143** 0.156** 0.143** 0.143** 
 
(2.16) （2.10） （2.19） （1.98） 
Size 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.97) （0.99） （0.72） （0.25） 
MTB 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 
(1.22) (1.21) (1.19) (1.22) 
Loss -0.013* -0.014** -0.015** -0.014** 
 
(-1.91) (-2.09) (-2.07) (-2.07) 
Leverage -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(-1.44) (-1.57) (-0.69) (-0.66) 
Beta 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.62) (0.64) (0.50) (0.66) 
Persistence 0.007* 0.008* 0.008* 0.008* 
 
(1.73) (1.75) (1.79) (1.72) 
Big4 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 
 
(0.87) (0.87) (0.99) (0.86) 
Auditor change 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.005 
 (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
Institutional ownership 0.030** 0.026** 0.023* 0.020* 
 
(2.03) (2.31) (1.90) (2.02) 
Financial expertise 0.380 0.391 0.375 0.382 
 (1.01) (0.99) (0.94) (1.10) 
Board size 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (1.15) (1.04) (1.06) (1.09) 
CEO age -0.006* -0.004* -0.001* -0.001* 
 (-1.85) (-1.66) (-1.73) (-1.70) 
CEO tenure -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.52) (-0.565) (-0.61) (-0.55) 
Length 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (1.01) (0.94) (0.81) (0.93) 
AQ 0.089** 0.093** 0.091** 0.092** 
  (2.34) (2.45) (2.38) (2.40) 
Treatment indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 8,976 7,920 5,840 8,976 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-Squared 0.091 0.087 0.089 0.087 
 
 
Table 4 presents the results from the estimation of regression (1). I regress 3-day cumulative 
abnormal returns around the annual earnings announcement (CAR) on unexpected earnings (UE), 
treatment indicators (Disclose, Post, Disclose*Post), control variables (firm characteristics), the 
interactions between UE and control variables, nonlinear, year fixed effects and industry fixed 
effects. The variable Disclose has different definitions in three columns. In column (1), Disclose is 
an indicator variable that equals one if a firm discloses any of the three dimensions of disclosure 
mentioned in Section 2, zero otherwise. In column (2), Disclose is an indicator variable which 
equals one if a firm discloses the first dimension of audit committee activities (i.e., annual review 
and evaluation of auditor’s work), zero otherwise. In column (3), Disclose is an indicator variable 
that equals one if a firm discloses the second dimension of audit committee activities (i.e., criteria 
for auditor selection), zero otherwise. In Column (4), Disclose is the number of dimensions that a 
firm discloses and represents the magnitude of disclosure. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5     Cross-sectional analysis of the impact of voluntary disclosure on ERC 
 
Dependent variable: CAR 
 Analyst following Return Volatility 
 Low High Diff Low High Diff 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
UE*Disclose*Post 0.568*** 0.320** -0.248*** 0.172** 0.395*** 0.223*** 
 (2.68) （2.89） (-3.21) (2.75) (4.36) (3.18) 
UE 0.239***  0.198*** -0.041*** 0.189** 0.302** 0.053* 
 
(3.11) （2.89） (-2.96) (1.99) (2.51) (1.90) 
UE*Disclose 0.145 0.122 -0.023 0.353 0.630 0.125 
 (1.25) （1.16） (-0.07) (0.04) (0.55) (0.85) 
UE*Post 0.203 0.186 -0.017 0.469 0.753 0.134 
  (0.64) （0.50） (-0.81) (1.44) (0.92) (1.09) 
UE*Firm Characteristics Yes Yes - Yes Yes - 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes - Yes Yes - 
Treatment indicators Yes Yes - Yes Yes - 
N  4,488 4,488 - 4,488 4,488 - 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes - Yes Yes - 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes - Yes Yes - 
Adj R-Squared 0.143 0.120 - 0.090 0.118 - 
   
Table 5 presents the results of the cross sectional analysis of effect of disclosure on ERC based on 
the information environment. Columns (1)-(3) show the effect of the level of analyst coverage, 
while columns (4)-(6) show the effect of return volatility. The columns titled “Low” represent the 
sample with analyst following or return volatility below the median, while the columns titled “High” 
represent the sample with analyst following or return volatility above the median. The column titled 
“Diff” tests the difference in coefficients between the two subsamples of analyst following or return 
volatility. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6   Impact of voluntary disclosure on DISP 
 
Dependent variable: DISP  
  Disclose 1 Disclose 2 Disclose 3 Disclose 4 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Disclose*Post -0.001** -0.001** -0.003* -0.003** 
  (-2.50) (-2.50) (-1.93) (-2.27) 
Disclose -0.000* -0.000* -0.002** -0.004*** 
  (-1.66) (-1.67) (-2.41) (-2.62) 
Post 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 
  (0.29) (0.29) (1.28) (1.22) 
Size -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
  (-3.58) (-3.57) (-3.84) (-3.55) 
MTB -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** 
  (-2.92) (-2.89) (-3.01) (-2.88) 
Loss 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 
  (6.67) (6.65) (7.30) (7.00) 
Leverage 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  (3.03) (3.02) (3.12) (3.03) 
Beta -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.000 
  (-0.99) (-0.97) (-0.83) (-0.99) 
Persistence -0.045** -0.045** -0.045** -0.046** 
  (-2.05) (-2.05) (-2.05) (-2.06) 
Big4 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (-2.59) (-2.59) (-2.68) (-2.59) 
Auditor change 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (1.61) (1.60) (1.61) (1.62) 
Institutional ownership -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
 
(-2.26) (-2.54) (-2.45) (-2.53) 
Financial expertise -0.020* -0.020* -0.020* -0.018* 
 (-1.68) (-1.68) (-1.67) (-1.54) 
Board size 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (2.62) (2.49) (2.64) (2.67) 
CEO age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.44) (0.43) (0.42) (0.43) 
CEO tenure -0.002* -0.002* -0.001* -0.001* 
 (-3.50) (-3.54) (-3.58) (-3.51) 
Length 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.79) (0.81) (0.73) (0.81) 
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AQ -0.051** -0.050** -0.050** -0.051** 
  (-2.35) (-2.33) (-2.33) (-2.34) 
N 8,976 7,920 5,840 8,976 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-Squared 0.129 0.129 0.127 0.126 
 
Table 6 presents the results from the estimation of regression (2). I regress analyst forecast 
dispersion (DISP) on treatment indicators (Disclose, Post, Disclose*Post), control variables (firm 
characteristics), year fixed effects and industry fixed effects. The variable Disclose has different 
definitions in three columns. In column (1), Disclose is an indicator variable that equals one if a 
firm discloses any of the three dimensions of disclosure mentioned in Section 2, zero otherwise. In 
column (2), Disclose is an indicator variable which equals one if a firm discloses the first dimension 
of audit committee activities (i.e., annual review and evaluation of auditor’s work), zero otherwise. 
In column (3), Disclose is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm discloses the second 
dimension of audit committee activities (i.e., criteria for auditor selection), zero otherwise. In 
Column (4), Disclose is the number of dimensions that a firm discloses and represents the 
magnitude of disclosure. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 7     Cross-sectional analysis of the impact of voluntary disclosure on DISP 
 
Dependent variable: DISP 
 Analyst coverage Return Volatility 
 Low High Diff Low High Diff 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Disclose*Post -0.003** -0.001** -0.002** -0.000** -0.002*** -0.002** 
 (-2.49) (-2.35) (-2.88) (-2.45) (-3.01) (-3.44)  
Disclose -0.000* -0.000 -0.000* -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (-1.66) (-1.41) (-1.87) (-0.65) (-0.53) (0.48)  
Post 0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.004 0.003 
  (0.29) (0.13) (-1.20) (1.52) (0.65) (1.01)  
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes - Yes Yes - 
N  4,488 4,488 - 4,487 4,489 - 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes - Yes Yes - 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes - Yes Yes - 
Adj R-Squared 0.207 0.088 - 0.013 0.207 - 
   
Table 7 presents results of the cross sectional analysis of effect of disclosure on DISP based on the 
information environment. Columns (1)-(3) show the effect of the level of analyst coverage, while 
columns (4)-(6) show the effect of return volatility. The columns titled “Low” represent the sample 
with analyst following or return volatility below the median, while the columns titled “High” 
represent the sample with analyst following or return volatility above the median. The column titled 
“Diff” tests the difference in coefficients between the two subsamples of analyst following or return 
volatility. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8     Impact of accounting quality (AQ) change on ERC and DISP 
Panel A: AQ change around the initiation of voluntary disclosure                    
Dependent variable: AQ  
 
Performance matched 
(Kothari et al. 2005) 
McNichols DDJ (McNichols 
2002) 
 (1) (2) 
Disclose*Post 0.011 0.009 
 (1.05) (1.33) 
Disclose -0.003 -0.005 
 (-0.61) (-0.97)    
Post -0.001 -0.003 
 (-0.48) (-0.93)    
Size -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (-5.79) (-5.83)    
MTB 0.000 0.0000 
 (0.22) (0.20) 
Loss 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (3.79) (3.98) 
Leverage 0.000 0.001 
 (0.17) (0.25)    
Beta 0.003 0.002 
 (0.67) (0.75)    
Persistence 0.008*** 0.009** 
 (2.84) (2.87) 
Big4 0.023*** 0.025*** 
 (4.90) (4.83)    
Auditor change -0.008** 0.008** 
 (-2.09) (2.05)    
Institutional Ownership 0.021*** 0.029*** 
 (2.97) (2.94) 
Financial expertise 0.023* 0.020* 
 (1.94) (1.86) 
Board size 0.002*** 0.003*** 
 (3.69) (3.71) 
CEO age -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-5.11) (-5.17) 
CEO tenure 0.000* 0.000* 
 (1.92) (1.91) 
Length 0.001 0.000 
 (0.30) (0.48) 
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N  8,976 8,976 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Adj R-Squared 0.196 0.187 
           
Panel B: Impact of voluntary disclosure on ERC for AQ subsamples 
Dependent variable: CAR      
 
AQ Performance matched 
 (Kothari et al. 2005) 
AQ McNichols DDJ  
(McNichols 2002) 
 
Subsample 
of Low 
AQ1 
Subsample 
of High 
AQ1 
Differen
ce in 
coefficie
nts 
Subsampl
e of Low 
AQ2 
Subsample 
of High 
AQ2 
Differen
ce in 
coeffici
ents 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
UE*Disclose*
Post 
0.399*** 0.405*** 0.005 0.385*** 0.397*** -0.012 
 
(3.01) (3.38)    (0.65)  (4.01) (3.64)    (-0.74)  
UE 0.400**  0.404** 0.004 0.372* 0.361** -0.011 
 (2.18) (2.24)    (0.90)  (1.89) (2.24)    (-1.36)  
UE*Disclose 0.143 0.135 0.008 0.127 0.122 -0.005 
 
(0.54)    (0.78) (0.39)  (0.48)    (0.62) (-0.86)  
UE*Post 0.231 0.192 0.039 0.245 0.242 -0.003 
 (0.66) (0.49)    (0.33)  (0.96)    (0.77)    (-1.13)  
UE*Size 0.238*  0.249** 0.011 0.313* 0.320** 0.007 
 
(2.18) (2.23)     (0.25) (2.29) (2.56)     (0.46) 
UE*MTB 0.045** 0.048** 0.003 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.000 
 
(2.30) (2.35)    (0.47)  (3.13)    (3.16)    (0.01)  
UE*Loss -1.04**  -1.04*** 0.01 -1.050*** -1.046*** 0.004 
 
(-1.88)    (-1.81)     (0.50) (-2.87)    (-3.02)     (-1.28) 
UE*Leverage -0.023 -0.022*  -0.001 -0.032  -0.029*  0.003 
 
(-1.05)    (-1.20) (-0.78)  (-1.39) (-1.20) (0.11)  
UE*Beta 0.562*** 0.564*** 0.002 0.541*** 0.549*** 0.008 
 
(2.94)    (2.79)    (0.68)  (2.91) (3.11)    (0.39)  
UE*Persistence 0.964*** 0.970*** 0.006 1.103*** 1.105*** 0.002 
 (2.65) (0.78)    (1.03)  (3.28)    (3.30)    (0.57)  
UE*Big4  0.667 0.670 0.003 0.770 0.770 -0.002 
 (1.60)  (2.52) (0.14) (1.49) (1.45) (0.72) 
UE*Auditor 
change 
0.591 0.594 0.003 0.564 0.564 0.000 
 (0.62) (0.89) (0.12) (0.70) (0.70) (0.55) 
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UE* 
Institutional 
ownership 
1.550  1.553 0.003 1.602 1.605** 0.003 
 (0.94)  (0.90)    (0.13)  (0.86)    (0.90)    (0.33)  
UE*Financial 
expertise 
0.313 0.310 -0.003 0.346 0.346 0.000 
 (1.27) (1.36) (0.22) (1.35) (1.40) (0.17) 
UE*Board size -0.473*** -0.473*** 0.000 -0.507*** -0.507*** 0.000 
 (-2.66) (-2.59) (0.01) (-2.81) (-3.03) (0.45) 
UE*CEO age -0.033 -0.035 -0.002 -0.041 -0.043 -0.002 
 (-1.54) (-1.58) (0.87) (-1.52) (-1.62) (0.49) 
UE*CEO 
tenure 
-0.116 -0.119 -0.003 -0.139 -0.150 -0.011 
 (-1.60) (-1.63) (0.66) (-1.47) (-1.55) (1.28) 
UE*Length 0.835*** 0.820*** -0.015 0.865*** 0.864*** -0.001 
 (2.85) (2.66) (0.07) (2.92) (2.92) (0.57) 
Firm 
Characteristics 
Yes Yes - Yes Yes - 
Treatment 
indicators 
Yes Yes - Yes Yes - 
Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes - Yes Yes - 
Year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes - Yes Yes - 
N 4,487 4,489 - 4,486 4,490 - 
Adj R-Squared 0.112 0.117 - 0.153 0.158 - 
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Panel C: Impact of voluntary disclosure on DISP for AQ subsamples 
Dependent variable: DISP      
 AQ Performance matched 
 (Kothari et al. 2005) 
AQ McNichols DDJ  
(McNichols 2002) 
 Subsampl
e of Low 
AQ1 
Subsample 
of High 
AQ1 
Differe
nce in 
coeffici
ents 
Subsampl
e of Low 
AQ2 
Subsample 
of High 
AQ2 
Differen
ce in 
coefficie
nts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Disclose*Post -0.002** -0.001*** -0.001 -0.002** -0.002** 0.000 
 
(2.09) (-2.27) (-0.85)  (-2.52) (-2.58) (0.84)  
Disclose -0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 
 
(-0.87) (-0.61) (1.26)  (-0.93) (-0.89) (1.36)  
Post 0.000 0.004 0.003* 0.001 0.003 0.002 
 (0.72) (1.26) (1.68)  (0.66) (0.81) (1.12)  
Size -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.001* 
 
(-3.10) (-2.98)  (0.90) (-2.59) (-2.97)  (1.65) 
MTB -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000** 0.000 
 
(-2.84) (-3.01) (-1.29)  (-2.61) (-2.19) (-1.33)  
Loss 0.013*** 0.023*** 0.010* 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.004 
 
(4.49) (4.99)  (1.81) (5.77) (5.24)  (1.46) 
Leverage 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 
 
(2.15) (1.98) (0.41)  (2.12) (1.98) (0.40)  
Beta -0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 
 
(-1.33) (-1.41) (0.45)  (-0.90) (-1.11) (-0.83)  
Persistence -0.052** -0.047*** 0.005 -0.048** -0.048** 0.000 
 (-2.15) (-4.15) (0.90)  (-2.32) (-3.12) (0.67)  
Big4 -0.005*** -0.005** 0.000 -0.004** -0.004** 0.000 
 (-2.43) (-2.30) (0.45) (-2.22) (-2.10) (0.27) 
Auditor change 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.000 
 (1.32) (1.47) (0.61) (0.93) (0.1.01) (0.78) 
Institutional 
ownership 
-0.008* -0.008* 0.000 -0.008* -0.009** -0.001 
 (-1.92) (-2.03) (-0.71) (-1.83) (-2.02) (-1.30)  
Financial 
expertise 
-0.020* -0.020* 0.000 -0.030*    -0.030* 0.000 
 (-1.87) (-1.68) 0.67) (-1.83) (-1.79) (0.54) 
Board size 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.001** 0.001** 0.000 
 (2.42) (2.49) (0.05) (2.48) (2.41) (0.03) 
CEO age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 
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 (1.51) (1.45) (0.42) (1.77) (1.67) (0.30) 
CEO tenure -0.000* -0.000** 0.000 -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.000 
 (-2.21) (-2.48) (1.00) (-3.90) (-4.04) (0.46) 
Length 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.89) (1.17) (0.88) (0.62) (0.49) (0.64) 
Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes - Yes Yes - 
Year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes - Yes Yes - 
N 4,487 4,489 - 4,486 4,490 - 
Adj R-Squared 0.126 0.147 - 0.135 0.137 - 
 
Table 8 presents results of the tests of change of Accounting Quality (AQ). AQ is quality of accruals 
measured by Kothari et al. (2005) and McNichols (2002). Panel A demonstrates AQ change around 
the time of initial disclosure. Disclose has the same definition as in Table 3. Post is an indicator 
variable that equals one in the year of initiating disclosure and years thereafter until the disclosure 
discontinues, zero otherwise. Panel B presents the results of the impact of disclosure on the ERC 
for the subsamples ranked by AQ. Panel C presents the results of the impact of disclosure on DISP 
for the subsamples ranked by AQ. In both panels, AQ1 is the quality of accruals measured by 
Kothari et al. (2005) and AQ2 is the quality of accruals measured by McNichols (2002). Columns 
(1) and (4) report results for the sample with below-median AQ, columns (2) and (5) report results 
for the sample with AQ above the median, and columns (3) and (6) presents results of tests of 
differences in coefficients between columns (1) and (2) and coefficients between columns (4) and 
(5). ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9   Impact of discontinuance of voluntary disclosure on ERC 
 
Dependent variable: CAR 
 Full sample Subsample of return volatility 
      High Low Difference  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
UE*Discontinue*Post -0.285* -0.353**   -0.240 0.113** 
 (-1.89) (-2.17) (-1.52) (2.40) 
UE 0.396*** 0.405***  0.400*** 0.005* 
 (2.75) (2.89) (2.67) (1.69) 
UE*Discontinue -0.019 -0.014 -0.010 -0.004 
 (-0.51) (-0.75)    (-0.66) (-0.30) 
UE*Post -0.010 -0.010* -0.008* -0.002 
 (-1.46) (-1.73)    (-1.89) (-0.40) 
UE*Size 0.032 0.041 0.039 0.002 
 (1.28) (1.49) (1.16) (0.59) 
UE*MTB -0.027** -0.030** -0.031*** 0.001 
 (-2.30) (-2.16)    (-3.23) (0.44) 
UE*Loss -0.062 -0.057 -0.052 -0.005 
 (-1.57) (-1.30)    (-1.16) (-0.51) 
UE*Leverage 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.001 
 (1.11) (1.01) (1.17) (0.77) 
UE*Beta -0.454** -0.482** -0.466*** -0.016 
 (-1.99) (-2.17)    (-2.89) (-0.67) 
UE*Persistence -0.030 -0.032 -0.046 0.014 
 (-0.84) (-0.43)    (-0.69) (0.30) 
UE*Big4 -0.069 -0.067 -0.070 0.003 
 (-1.18) (-1.04)    (-1.21) (1.01) 
UE*Auditor change 0.431 0.399 0.410 -0.001 
 (0.32) (1.01) (1.09) (0.22) 
UE* Institutional ownership 0.029* 0.032* 0.020* 0.012 
 (1.80) (1.73)    (1.89) (0.67) 
UE*Financial expertise 0.080 0.093 0.075 0.018 
 (0.52) (0.66) (0.86) (0.21) 
UE*Board size -0.011 -0.014 -0.010 -0.004 
 (-0.34) (-0.44) (-0.52) (-0.33) 
UE*CEO age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
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 (0.10) (0.37) (0.41) (0.48) 
UE*CEO tenure -0.02* -0.010* -0.030* 0.02 
 (-1.90) (-2.11) (-1.70) (1.46) 
UE*Length 0.084 0.095 0.076 0.019 
 (0.52) (0.48) (0.46) (0.49) 
UE*AQ 2.474*** 2.510*** 2.200*** 0.310 
 (4.30) (3.99) (3.30) (1.27) 
Treatment indicators Yes Yes Yes - 
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes Yes - 
N     2,008 1,004 1,004 - 
Adj R-Squared 0.061 0.064 0.062 - 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes - 
Year fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes - 
 
Table 9 reports the results of the impact of discontinuance of voluntary disclosure on ERC and 
cross sectional analysis on subsamples of information environment (return volatility). Discontinue 
is an indicator variable that equals one if firms disclose any of the three dimensions of audit 
committee disclosures, zero otherwise. Post is an indicator variable that equals one for the year in 
which a firm stops disclosing and years thereafter, zero otherwise. Column (1) reports results of 
the impact on ERC of the discontinuance of voluntary disclosure for the full sample. Columns (2) 
and (3) report results of the impact of discontinuance on ERC for the subsamples based on return 
volatility, where column (2) represents the subsample with return volatility above the median and 
column (3) represents the subsample with return volatility below the median. Column (4) tests the 
difference in coefficients between the two subsamples. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 10    Impact of accounting quality change (AQ) on ERC decrease 
 
Panel A: AQ change around the discontinuance of disclosure 
Dependent variable: AQ 
Dependent variable 
Performance matched  
(Kothari et al. 2005) 
McNichols DDJ  
(McNichols 2002) 
 (1) (2) 
Discontinue*Post -0.003 -0.005 
 (-0.43) (-0.62) 
Discontinue 0.041 0.042 
 (1.02) (0.99) 
Post -0.000 -0.002 
 (-0.99) (-0.86) 
Size -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.58) (-0.76) 
MTB -0.045*** -0.050*** 
 (-3.98) (-3.42) 
Loss 0.007** 0.005** 
 (2.17) (1.98) 
Leverage 0.018** 0.020** 
 (2.32) (2.24) 
Beta -0.016*** -0.014*** 
 (-3.19) (-3.00) 
Persistence 0.006 0.009 
 (0.42) (0.64) 
Big4 0.054** 0.061* 
 (2.00) (2.01) 
Auditor change -0.02* -0.000 
 (-1.80) (-1.20) 
Institutional ownership 0.026 0.019 
 (0.23) (0.38) 
Financial expertise 0.030 0.034 
 (1.02) (0.99) 
Board size 0.000 0.000 
 (0.72) (0.57) 
CEO age -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 (-2.91) (-3.03) 
CEO tenure -0.001 0.000 
 (1.19) (1.41) 
Length -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.49) (-0.76) 
N  2,008 2,008 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
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Adj R-Squared 0.252 0.254 
 
 
Panel B: Impact of voluntary disclosure on ERC for subsamples of AQ  
 
Dependent variable: CAR   
 
Subsample of 
Low AQ 
Subsample of High 
AQ 
Difference in 
coefficients 
 (1) (2) (3) 
UE*Discontinue*Post -0.182* -0.290* -0.008 
 (-1.78) (-1.84)    (-0.76)  
UE 0.306** 0.320** 0.014 
 (1.99) (2.54)    (1.01)  
UE*Discontinue -0.014 -0.013 0.001 
 (-0.54) (-0.59) (0.52)  
UE*Post -0.010 -0.019 0.009 
 (-1.46) (-1.44) (0.48)  
UE*Size 0.032 0.035 0.003 
 (1.28) (1.44)  (0.60) 
UE*MTB -0.027** -0.030** -0.003 
 (-2.30) (-2.13) (-1.38)  
UE*Loss -0.060 -0.057 0.003 
 (-1.57) (-1.48)  (1.15) 
UE*Leverage 0.002 0.002 0.000 
 (1.15) (0.96) (0.30)  
UE*Beta -0.350** -0.338** -0.012 
 (-2.29) (-2.41) (-1.25)  
UE*Persistence -0.020 -0.020 0.000 
 (-0.64) (-0.60) (0.71)  
UE*Big4 -0.043 -0.043 0.000 
 (-1.01) (-1.38) (0.86) 
UE*Auditor change 0.338 0.338 0.000 
 (0.400) (0.411) (0.53) 
UE* Institutional ownership 0.021* 0.034* 0.012 
 (1.74) (1.71) (0.75) 
UE*Financial expertise 0.076 0.084 0.008 
 (0.83) (1.00) (0.93) 
UE*Board size -0.009 -0.008 0.001 
 (-0.50) (-0.80) (0.15) 
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UE*CEO age 0.001 0.003 0.002 
 (0.31) (0.66) (0.05) 
UE*CEO tenure -0.014** -0.020** -0.006 
 (2.43) (2.01) (-1.43) 
UE*Length 0.068 0.058 -0.010 
 (0.56) (0.60) (0.93)  
Firm Characteristics Yes Yes - 
Treatment indicators Yes Yes - 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes - 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes - 
N 1,004 1,004 - 
Adj R-Squared 0.084 0.101 - 
 
Panel A of Table 10 analyzes the change in accounting quality before and after the discontinuance 
of disclosure. Discontinue is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm discloses any of the 
three dimensions of audit committee disclosures, zero otherwise. Post is an indicator variable that 
equals one for the year in which a firm stops disclosing and years thereafter, zero otherwise. 
Column (1) presents results with accruals quality based on performance matched discretionary 
accruals from Kothari et al. (2005), and column (2) with accruals quality based on (McNichols 
2002). Panel B reports the results of the impact on ERC of the discontinuance of voluntary 
disclosure of audit committee activities by subsamples of change in accounting quality (AQ). 
Column (1) reports results of the subsample of low AQ, and column (2) reports results of the 
subsample with high AQ. Column (3) reports tests of differences in coefficients between low and 
high AQ. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
61 
 
 
Table 11   Summary statistics for samples matched by propensity score  
 
    Mean   Median 
  Treated Control  Diff Treated Control Diff 
CAR 0.005 0.012 -0.007 0.004 0.007 -0.003 
UE -0.004 0.000 -0.004** 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Size 8.051 8.04 0.011 8.037 8.227 -0.19 
MTB 2.401 3.433 -1.031 2.536 2.442 0.094 
Loss 0.152 0.14 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Leverage 0.976 0.284 0.692** 0.439 0.459 -0.021 
Beta 1.245 1.188 0.058 1.152 1.237 -0.085 
Persistence 0.41 0.339 0.07 0.309 0.401 -0.093 
Big4 0.946 0.929 0.017 1.000 1.000 00.000 
Au-change 0.13 0.079 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Institutional 
ownership  
0.802 0.864 -0.062 0.836 0.907 -0.813 
Financial 
expertise 
8.680 7.984 0.696 8.000 9.000 -1.000 
Board size 49.271 51.843 -2.572 52.000 49.000 3.000 
CEO age 1.805 4.061 -2.256 2.000 0.000 2.000 
CEO tenure 9.948 10.037 -0.09 10.087 10.017 0.070 
Length 0.044 0.041 0.003 0.027 0.030 -0.003 
AQ 0.005 0.012 -0.007 0.004 0.007 -0.003 
N 207 706         
 
Table 11 reports distributional properties (mean, median) for treatment and (propensity score-
matched) control samples. The propensity score-matching procedure uses a panel of pre-disclosure 
firm-years and is performed without replacement, allowing for up to three matches per treated firm. 
Differences between the means are medians are presented in the columns labeled “Diff”. ***, **, 
* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Significance levels are 
calculated using a t-test for the difference in means and F-test for the difference in variances. 
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Table 12   Impact of voluntary disclosure on ERC and DISP under propensity score 
matching method 
 
Panel A: The impact of voluntary disclosure on ERC 
Dependent variable: CAR  
  Disclose 1 Disclose 2 Disclose 3 Disclose 4 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
UE*Disclose*Post 0.314*** 0.309*** 0.327*** 0.322*** 
 (2.65)    （2.89） （2.82） （3.86） 
UE 0.570**  0.568** 0.473** 0.529*** 
 (2.55) （2.34） （2.07） （2.64） 
UE*Disclose 0.208* 0.211* 0.206 0.213* 
 (1.71) （1.80） （1.43） （1.80） 
UE*Post 0.337 0.337 0.242 0.325 
 (1.49)    （1.30） （0.61） （1.34） 
UE*Size 0.503** 0.500** 0.434** 0.516*** 
 (2.36) （2.56） （2.07） （2.65） 
UE*MTB 0.049* 0.051** 0.055*** 0.053** 
 (1.92) （1.97） （2.82） （2.36） 
UE*Loss -0.425** -0.434** -0.426** -0.445** 
 (-2.53)    （-2.34） （-2.01） （-1.90） 
UE*Leverage -0.073 -0.074 -0.068 -0.087 
 (-1.06)    （-1.04） （-1.20） （-1.16） 
UE*Beta 0.846** 0.847** 0.785* 0.821** 
 (2.28)    （2.31） （1.91） （2.36） 
UE*Persistence 0.873** 0.792** 0.695** 0.804** 
 (2.36) （1.98） （2.15） （2.34） 
UE*Big4 1.340   1.283 1.172 1.372 
 (0.80)    （1.42） （1.04） （1.29） 
UE*Auditor change -0.209** -0.243** -0.198** -0.216** 
 (-2.33) (-2.21) (-1.99) (-2.10) 
UE* Institutional ownership 0.761  0.691 0.597 0.752 
 (0.53)  （0.81） （1.02） （0.48） 
UE*Financial expertise 0.023 0.023 0.019 0.020 
 (0.98) (0.82) (0.80) (1.05) 
UE*Board size -0.384 -0.401 -0.348 -0.502 
 (-1.15) (-1.28) (-0.96) (-1.48) 
UE*CEO age -0.044 -0.052 -0.062 -0.078 
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 (-0.73) (-0.63) (-0.91) (-0.79) 
UE*CEO tenure -0.012 -0.020 -0.020 -0.016 
 (-0.12) (-0.31) (-1.09) (-0.90) 
UE*Length 0.980*** 0.894** 0.739** 0.896** 
 (2.60) (2.01) (2.13) (2.18) 
UE*AQ 0.627** 0.701** 0.498* 0.840** 
 (1.98) （2.31） （1.89） （2.16） 
Treatment indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 913 870 899 913 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-Squared 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.159 
 
Panel B: The impact of voluntary disclosure on DISP 
 
Dependent variable: DISP  
  Disclose 1 Disclose 2 Disclose 3 Disclose 4 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Disclose*Post -0.002** -0.002** -0.001* -0.002** 
  (-2.27) (-2.23) (-1.87) (-2.31) 
Disclose -0.001* -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 
  (-1.67) (-1.70) (-1.49) (-2.01) 
Post 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 
  (1.23) (1.28) (0.99) (1.12) 
Size -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
  (-2.27) (-2.48) (-2.24) (-2.40) 
MTB -0.001* -0.001* -0.000 -0.001* 
  (-1.65) (-1.66) (-1.27) (-1.75) 
Loss 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 
  (2.86) (3.01) (3.59) (3.49) 
Leverage 0.000 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  (1.41) (1.30) (1.11) (1.31) 
Beta -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.64) (-0.56) (-0.25) (-0.51) 
Persistence -0.007** -0.007** -0.005* -0.006** 
  (-2.05) (-2.27) (-1.69) (-2.25) 
Big4 -0.005* -0.005* -0.004 -0.005* 
 (-1.67) (-1.65) (-1.29) (-1.72) 
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Auditor change 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (1.46) (1.52) (1.11) (1.03) 
Institutional ownership -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
 
(-2.34) (-2.54) (-2.22) (-2.41) 
Financial expertise -0.020 -0.020 -0.018 -0.021 
 (-1.32) (-1.31) (-0.71) (-1.50) 
Board size 0.001** 0.001** 0.000* 0.001** 
 (2.11) (1.98) (1.87) (2.41) 
CEO age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.61) (-1.35) (-0.42) (-1.33) 
CEO tenure -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001* 
 (-1.40) (-1.42) (-1.44) (-3.51) 
Length 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.91) (0.84) (0.76) (0.81) 
AQ -0.071** -0.070** -0.067* -0.071** 
  (-2.01) (-2.23) (-1.84) (-2.38) 
N 913 870 899 913 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-Squared 0.254 0.254 0.253 0.254 
 
Table 12 reports the results of the impact of initiation of disclosure on ERC and DISP for a sample 
of disclosing firms and a sample of control firms using a propensity-matching method. In column 
(1), Disclose is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm discloses any of the three dimensions 
of disclosure mentioned in Section 2, zero otherwise. In column (2), Disclose is an indicator 
variable which equals one if a firm discloses the first dimension of audit committee activities (i.e., 
annual review and evaluation of auditor’s work), zero otherwise. In column (3), Disclose is an 
indicator variable that equals one if a firm discloses the second dimension of audit committee 
activities (i.e., criteria for auditor selection), zero otherwise. In column (4), Disclose is the number 
of dimensions that a firm discloses and represents the magnitude of disclosure. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix 1 Variable definitions 
 
Variable Name Description 
CAR Cumulative abnormal return. A firm’s 3-day return, centered on the 
annual earnings announcement date, less the CRSP market return over 
the same period. The earnings announcement date is defined as the 
earliest date available on Compustat or I/B/E/S. If the earnings 
announcement date is taken from I/B/E/S, the announcement date is the 
same (next) trading day if the announcement time is earlier (later) than 
4pm EST. 
 
DISP Analyst forecast dispersion measured as the standard deviation of 
annual analyst forecasts, scaled by end of year stock price. 
 
UE  Earnings surprise. The difference between the I/B/E/S actual and the 
median I/B/E/S forecast of annual EPS (using the most recent forecast 
of an analyst) over a window beginning 95 calendar days prior to the 
earnings announcement and ending three days prior to the earnings 
announcement scaled by the CRSP price two days prior to the earnings 
announcement. 
 
 
Disclose Indicator variable that equals one if a firm voluntarily discloses audit 
committee activities over the period 2003-2015, otherwise zero. I use 
four alternative measures of Disclose:  
 
Disclose1 is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm discloses any 
of the three dimensions of disclosure mentioned in section 2, otherwise 
zero.  
 
Disclose2 is an indicator variable which equals one if a firm discloses 
the first dimension of disclosure mentioned in section 2, otherwise 
zero.  
 
Disclose3 is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm discloses 
information about the second dimension of disclosure mentioned in 
section 2, otherwise zero.  
 
Disclose4 is the number of dimensions of audit committee activities 
disclosed by a firm on a scale of 1 to 3. 
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Discontinue Indicator variable that equals one for the treatment sample of disclosers 
and zero for non-disclosers for the tests of change in ERC in the post-
discontinuance period. 
 
 
 
Appendix 1: Variable definitions (continued) 
 
Variable Name Description 
Post (i) When examining the impact of disclosure on ERC in the post-
disclosure period, Post is an indicator variable which equals one for 
year t, the disclosure initiation year and the following years until the 
disclosure is discontinued, otherwise zero.  
 
(ii) When evaluating in the impact of discontinuance of disclosure on 
ERC in the post-discontinuance period, Post is an indicator variable 
which equals one for year t, the disclosure discontinuance year and all 
years thereafter, otherwise zero. 
 
Beta The coefficient from regressing excess daily returns on excess market 
returns over one calendar year, ending on the fiscal year-end date. The 
risk-free rate is from Ken French's data library.  
 
Leverage Financial leverage is the ratio of total liabilities (debt in current 
liabilities + long term debt) to total equity, measured at the fiscal-
year-end, from Compustat. 
 
Loss Accounting loss indicator. An indicator variable coded as one when 
basic earnings per share excluding extraordinary items (Compustat 
epspx) is less than zero, and zero otherwise. 
 
MTB Market to book ratio. The ratio of the market value of equity to the 
book value of equity, measured at the fiscal-year-end, from 
Compustat. 
 
Persistence Earnings persistence. The coefficient from regressing basic EPS 
excluding extraordinary items (epspx) from Compustat on lagged 
EPS using (where available) up to 10 years of data. 
 
Size Firm's size. The log of market value of equity, measured at fiscal-
year-end, from Compustat. 
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Auditor change An indicator variable which equals one for year t, the year of auditor 
change and the following years, zero otherwise. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1: Variable definitions (continued) 
 
Variable Name Description 
AQ Accounting Quality. Performance-matched 
discretionary accruals from  Kothari, Leone and 
Wasley (2005). 
Each firm-year observation is matched with a firm-year 
from the same industry with the closest beginning-of-
year ROA. AQ is the absolute value of the difference 
between the discretionary accruals of the treatment 
firm-year and the matched firm-year. Discretionary 
accruals are based on the modified Jones model. 
 
Auditor change An indicator variable which equals one for year t, the 
year of auditor change and the following years, zero 
otherwise. 
 
Analyst coverage Number of analysts following a firm in a given fiscal 
year. The count is based on the number of unique 
analysts who issue at least one forecast on I/B/E/S in a 
window beginning 360 days prior to the earnings 
announcement and ending three days prior to the 
earnings announcement. When no forecasts are 
observed, I set this count to zero. 
 
Institutional ownership The end-of-year total institutional stock-holding 
divided by the number of common shares outstanding, 
from Thomson Reuters. 
 
Big4 An indicator variable which equals one if the firm’s 
financial statements are audited by one of the Big 4 
accounting firms in that fiscal year, zero otherwise. 
 
Volatility Stock return volatility. The stock-return volatility in the 
prior year before the earnings announcement date.  
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Financial expertise The percentage of audit committee members who have 
financial expertise. 
Board size The size of the board, which is the number of directors 
on the board. 
 
Appendix 1: Variable definitions (continued) 
 
Variable Name Description 
Alternative measure of AQ Accruals Quality calculated using McNichols (2002) 
from the regression of working capital accruals on 
current, lagged, and leading operating cash flows, gross 
PPE and change in sales. Working capital accruals are 
calculated as Δ𝐴𝑅+Δ𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦−Δ𝐴𝑃−Δ𝑇𝑃+Δ𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 (𝑛𝑒𝑡), where AR is accounts receivable, AP is 
accounts payable, and TP is taxes payable. 
 
CEO age The age of the CEO in a given fiscal year. 
CEO tenure The tenure years of the CEO in a given fiscal year 
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Appendix 2: Keywords lists for audit committee voluntary disclosure 
 
Dimension of disclosure Keywords for capturing the dimension of disclosure 
Annual evaluation and review 
Audit committee, Annual, Review, Performance, 
Responsibility, Appoint, Independent, Auditor.  
Auditor selection criteria 
Audit committee, Consider, Factors, Capability, 
Knowledge, Expertise,  Qualifications, Appoint, 
Independence, 
Engagement partner 
Audit committee, Engagement partner, Appoint, 
Change, Rotate 
 
I categorize the disclosure into three dimensions based on reported trends (CAQ reports 
2014–2016), SEC’s conceptual release (2015), and the literature about the audit committee 
oversight process (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson and Neal, 2009). I create lists of words that refer 
to these dimensions of disclosure. After reading numerous proxy statements, I compile three lists 
of keywords that most commonly appear in proxy statements for each dimension of audit 
committee activities as follows: (i) “Audit committee,” “Annual,” “Review,” “Performance,” 
“Responsibility,” “Appoint,” “Independent,” “Auditor,”; (ii) “Audit committee,” “consider,” 
“Factors,” “Capability,” “Knowledge,” “Expertise,” “Quality,” “Independence,” “Appoint,”; (iii) 
“Audit committee,” “Engagement partner,” “Appoint,” “Change,” “Rotate”. I also include common 
variations of these words as keywords, e.g., “independence” in place of “independent.”  For the 
keywords “Review”, “Appoint” and “Auditor” in the list, I use multiple substitutes that have similar 
meaning. “Discuss” and “Assess” are used as substitutes for “Review,” if “Review” is not found. 
“Engage,” “Retain,” and “Select” are used as substitutes for “Appoint,” if “Appoint” is not found. 
“Accounting firm” is used as a substitute for “Auditor”.  
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           Appendix 3: Example of voluntary disclosure about audit committee activity  
 
The excerpts reported below are from the disclosure about audit committee activities in the 
proxy statement of Lam Research Group in 2015. The objective of the disclosure is to make 
investors aware of how the company’s audit committee executes its responsibilities in the 
auditor ratification process. I provide the excerpts to show that there are firms who disclose 
detailed information about audit committee’s oversight activities, over and above the 
disclosures required by existing rules on audit committee disclosures.  
 
“Annual Evaluation and Selection of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm 
 
 The audit committee annually evaluates the performance of the Company’s 
independent registered public accounting firm, including the senior audit engagement 
team, and determines whether to reengage the current accounting firm or consider other 
audit firms. Factors considered by the audit committee in deciding whether to retain [Audit 
Firm] include: 
(i) [Audit Firm]’s global capabilities to handle the breadth and complexity of the 
Company’s global operations; 
 
(ii) [Audit Firm]’s technical expertise and knowledge of the Company’s industry and 
global operations; 
 
(iii) the quality and candor of [Audit Firm]’s communications with the audit committee 
and management; 
 
(iv) [Audit Firm]’s independence; 
 
(v) the quality and efficiency of the services provided by [Audit Firm], including input from 
management on [Audit Firm]’s performance and how effectively [Audit Firm] 
demonstrated its independent judgment, objectivity and professional skepticism; 
 
(vi) the appropriateness of [Audit Firm]’s fees; and 
 
(vii) [Audit Firm]’s tenure as our independent auditor, including the benefits of that tenure, 
and the controls and processes in place (such as rotation of key partners) that help ensure 
[Audit Firm]’s continued independence in the face of such tenure.” 
 
